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Abstract 
In June 2010, the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan were marred by ethnic violence between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Murders, arsons, rapes and widespread violence were dominating the 
region for four days and ethnic Uzbeks were primarily the victims. Nationalism had been 
on the rise and several international observers had warned of the possibility of ethnic 
tensions turning violent. The state failed to intervene and stop the violence, and in the 
aftermath the state almost entirely took legal and prosecutorial measures against ethnic 
Uzbeks. Kyrgyzstan has however been described as an island of democracy by observers, 
comparing Kyrgyzstan to its autocratic neighbours. So how could a democracy fail to 
protect its own citizens and act legally biased? To answer this question, this paper uses 
theory regarding; democracy criticism, nationalism, stigma, transitional justice, ethnicity, 
concept of the other and Voice, Exit and Loyalty. The paper concludes that democracy has 
not been a hindrance to ethnic violence, on the contrary  democracy has been a vehicle 
for nationalists to promote their ideas. 
Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Minority, Democracy, Nationalism, Stigma, 
Transitional Justice, Ethnicity, The Other, Voice, Exit and Loyalty and Central Asia        
Authors: Troels Kølln and Andreas Winther Rohde  
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Kyrgyzstan – a brief overview 
Kyrgyzstan (191,300 sq km), officially the Kyrgyz Republic, is a multi-ethnic 
country and former Soviet republic. It lies landlocked between Tajikistan to the 
south, Kazakhstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the west, and China to the east.  
Political system and climate  
The political superstructure in Kyrgyzstan is formed as a unitary parliamentary 
republic as defined by the 2010 constitution. The parliament, Jogorku Kenesh, is 
a 120-seat unicameral chamber elected for five year terms. The current 
government (since 2011) is supported by 113 of 120  deputies. It is a coalition of 
the Social-Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, Respublika (Communist Party), Ata-
Meken (Fatherland) and Ar-Namy (Dignity). In oppositions sits the nationalist Ata 
Jurt (Fatherland) Next parliamentary elections are due in 2015.  
Economy 
The main exports of Kyrgyzstan are metals and minerals, woolen products, and 
electric energy – traded mostly to Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The three 
main suppliers of import is Russia, China and Kazakhstan. The trade deficit has 
remained negative over the past years indicating the lack of production in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
There is somewhere between 300.000 and 500.000 temporary migrant workers 
in Kazakhstan or Russia, doing unskilled labour. 
Demography 
There more than 90 ethnic groups with the Kyrgyz being the most dominant one. 
Uzbeks are mostly present in the southern parts of the country. 
The share of Kyrgyz in the population has increased from 52 percent to 69 percent 
since the beginning of the 1990s, while the Russians has decreased from 21 
percent to less than 9 percent by 2008, mainly because of migration of Russians 
and a higher birthrate within the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. 
35 percent of the population live in urban area, 65 percent in rural villages. One 
third of the population being children and teenagers. The north-south division is 
reflected in different language proficiencies. In the north people speak Russian 
and in the south Kyrgyz and Uzbek are more prevalent. 
Sources: (Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012, The Economist 2013, The World Bank , Fumagalli 2012: 866) 
Quick stats 
Population:5,580,00 (2012) 
Main ethnic groups: Kyrgyz (71%), 
Uzbek (14%), Russian (8%).  
Official languages: Kyrgyz, Russian. 
Religion: Moderate Islam 
Main cities: Bishkek (capital, pop. 
854,000), Osh (240,000), Jalal-Abad 
(89,000). 
GDP: USD6.5bn (2012 est.)  
Human Development Index: 0.582 
(125/186, 2010) 
Life expectancy: 70 (2011 est.) 
Access to improved water source: 
88.7% 
Internet users: 20% 
Infant mortality rate: 25.1/1,000 live 
births 
President: Almazbek Atambayev (Social 
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan) 
Prime Minister: Zhantoro Satybaldiyev 
(independent)1 
Monetary unit: Som 
National flag: 
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Figure1: (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010) 
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Introduction 
 
“They went to the building in our courtyard where my son was staying. 
When they came out, they set fire to the house while my son was still 
there. They … forced me to watch as the house burned down with my 
son inside.”  
- Nigora, an Uzbek woman in Osh, Kyrgyzstan 
 (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 30) 
 
In the four days that have since been known as the June 2010 Events, buildings would be 
burned, women raped, both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz people killed by hand or by automatic 
weapons taken from the police, hostages taken and a state of emergency declared by the 
government. In the end, the riots resulted in 470 deaths, 110,000 people being displaced 
to neighbouring Uzbekistan, 300,000 displaced internally and 2800 properties damaged. 
Uzbeks carried by far the greatest casualties (Solvang 2011, Kiljunen 2011). 
 
Many scholars and international observers had warned of such a conflict prior, but the 
brutality and heinous nature of the attacks shocked many in Kyrgyzstan. This was, 
however, not the first example of large-scale ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, the only 
Central Asian democratic state. Rather, the violence was strikingly similar to riots in 1990, 
where the reallocation of large portions of land from Uzbeks to the Kyrgyz resulted in an 
uprising and more than 300 deaths (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010).  
Interestingly, Kyrgyzstan has long been viewed as an island of democracy in Central Asia. 
One could reasonably presume that a functional, representative democracy would help 
improve the status of minorities or at least adhere to the rule of law. So why has the 
conditions of the Uzbeks deteriorated? 
At a first glance, many things are being done to include minorities in society and protect 
them from discrimination. The former president Akayev (who was overthrown in 2005) 
seemingly prioritized inter-ethnic stability in the beginning of his administration and the 
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new government has introduced new institutions that work for improving the position of 
minorities. 
Yet, the Uzbek minority has turned from a privileged ethnic group during the Soviet era 
to a minority, excluded from political influence and generally viewed with scepticism by 
the Kyrgyz (Regina Faranda, David B Nolle 2003, Huskey, Hill 2011). Most Uzbeks see no 
future for themselves in Kyrgyzstan, yet neither do they see much of an alternative in 
returning to the authoritarian Uzbekistan, which has shown little interest in Uzbek 
communities abroad (Fumagalli 2007: 12-14, Jarnvig 2013). 
There have been proposed several reasons for this apparent paradox: A strong wave of 
nationalism in the post-Soviet nation-building of Kyrgyzstan, a power structure 
dominated by clan-based informal politics and the power vacuums that followed the 
oustings of the two presidents, as well as a strong north-south political divide, giving the 
national government little influence over the regional government in the south 
The answer lies somewhere in between. Matteo Fumagalli, a scholar in Central Asian 
studies, who has done much field work in Kyrgyzstan, calls for further research into the 
diversity of ethnic groups and the mechanisms through which political elites establish and 
consolidate control over the community (Fumagalli 2007: 226).  
It is in this spirit, we pose the question:  
Why have the conditions of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan worsened after the introduction 
of democracy? 
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Methodology 
In order to answer the problem formulation, several factors must be clarified, a range of 
data collected, and all this analyzed within the boundaries of a philosophy of science. In 
order to answer the problem formulation “Why has the recent emergence of democracy 
not improved or protected the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan” a series of questions arise: 
 What has been the role of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan in the past and what is it today? 
 How are Uzbeks taking part in the political system of democracy?  
 What marks the difference between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz ethnies? 
 In what way and to what degree have sentiments and ideologies of nationalism 
affected the Uzbeks? 
 How have Uzbeks reacted to this? 
 What should be done to improve the situation? 
Each of these working questions will be answered throughout this paper enabling us to 
create a comprehensive analysis and answer the problem formulation in a conclusion. In 
order to produce an answer we deem valid or plausible, an understanding of truth, 
causality and not observable data must be defined within the boundaries of a philosophy 
of science.  
Structure 
This paper is structured so the background information is provided first, and then follows 
an assessment of the level of democracy in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. After this our 
theoretical approach is presented and immediately applied; this means that the analysis 
and the presentation of theory are merged, which form the basis for our conclusion. We 
end with a discussion of which other answers we could have found if other approaches 
had been taken and possible actions that be taken in Kyrgyzstan to address the issue of 
ethnic tension, discrimination and violence. 
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Philosophy of Science 
Due to the nature of the subject, a clearly positivist approach that seeks to locate answers 
that are definitive, is not adequate. The Uzbek minority's role in Kyrgyz society is complex 
and unbiased data are hard to collect in a satisfactory quantity. Furthermore, democracy 
is a fluent concept that needs to be clarified. Therefore we utilize a critical realist 
approach.  
The critical realist approach allows us produce plausible answers to the problem 
formulation by triangulation of the data available. Critical realism operates with the 
concept of underlying structures, those are not necessarily visible to the observer, but 
they exist none the less (Jespersen 2005: 146). 
Critical realism operates with three domains in which reality is divided into: the empirical 
domain, the factual domain, and the real domain. The empirical domain consists of the 
observers own observations, knowledge and reflections (Buch-Hansen, Nielsen 2005: 24) 
thus stating that knowledge is not inter-subjective. What an individual observes and 
subsequently concludes from this is the result of that very individual's prior knowledge, 
experience, reflections and how the individual was able to observe the phenomena. Two 
individuals can observe the same phenomena and possibly derive two divergent analyzes 
and conclusions based on different pre-understandings (Jespersen 2005: 148).  
The second domain is factual and consists of all events and phenomena, regardless of 
them being observed (Buch-Hansen, Nielsen 2005: 24).  
The third domain, the real domain, consists of not directly observable phenomena, 
structures and underlying mechanisms. These structures can have casual effects and 
influence the two other domains (Buch-Hansen, Nielsen 2005: 24).  
In order to observe, analyze and comprehend the complex situation regarding the Uzbeks 
in Kyrgyzstan, we expect that underlying structures relating to ethnicity, clan-structures, 
political agendas and organized crime are present and at various levels act as causal 
factors. Critical realism is not an academic Pandora’s box that allows for unsubstantiated 
conclusions, but holds the researcher responsible to observe and collect most possible 
data in order to adequately triangulate the data produced, to create a conclusion deemed 
plausible.  
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Due to the nature of not observable structures and underlying mechanisms we are not 
able to produce a rigid answer stating the concise and unbiased nature of our problem, 
but we are however able to demonstrate a plausible link between data and theory, that 
form the basis of a plausible conclusion.   
Data collection 
The data collected in this project is a mix of interviews with experts, stakeholders and 
ordinary citizens in Kyrgyzstan, primary data such as statistics and economic indicators, 
original texts and secondary literature consisting of academic books and articles. The mix 
of these sources forms a solid basis for a comprehensive analysis and a plausible 
conclusion. 
Interviews 
We chose qualitative interviews with local stakeholders as our preferred way of collecting 
data, as it will allow us to observe possible indications of underlying structures better than 
a project produced solely on the available texts and statistics. The possibility to use 
testimonies, reflections and specialist knowledge from individuals in Kyrgyzstan in general 
and in Osh in particular adds validity to our analysis and subsequently the conclusion. 
The interviews took, for the most part, place in Bishkek and Osh in Kyrgyzstan in the time 
span November 2ndto 18th November 2013. Of the 17 days of field work, 11 were spent in 
Osh. This amount of time put certain constraints to our data gathering, which meant that 
multiple interviews with the same respondents were not an option and that we were not 
able to penetrate certain spheres. The spheres not penetrable are, but not limited to, the 
security apparatus and the political parties. 
The language barrier also proved a barrier, since English is not widely spoken by large 
segments of the population, not even within well-educated groups. This was primarily a 
challenge in Osh, where Russian to a higher degree was the second language than in 
Bishkek, where Russian was a first language and English and Kyrgyz competing on being 
the second language of choice. We overcame this language barrier with the use of a 
professional translator proficient in Russian, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and English, with working 
experience in major international agencies. The use of this translator did have some 
constraints. The translator was paid, which limited the time we could employ her. The 
translator was ethnic Uzbek and refused to talk with local and state authorities out of 
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fear, which limited our contact with these severely. We also used the translator to gain 
access to Uzbek communities affected by the June 2010 Events and relevant NGOs. 
Our contact with local, regional or state representatives has been limited to a principal of 
an Uzbek school. This poses a challenge to this paper, we have however a substantial 
amount of data accounting for the state’s role in regards to the June 2010 Events and the 
legal aftermath. The translator’s position is however a sign of the state of mind of many 
Uzbeks. Despite our translator being Uzbek, she did not engage in discussion with 
respondents who were critical of the Uzbek community or shared differing views on the 
June 2010 Events than she.  
Our initial interview was with Søren Jarnvig, deputy chairman in the Danish association 
Central Asian association with work experience at the OSCE School in Bishkek. The 
purpose was to have a pilot interview to gain preliminary knowledge and background 
information on Kyrgyzstan in general and the Uzbeks' situation in Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
On the basis of the interview and background research we identified a range of potential 
respondents who besides possessing relevant knowledge also could be part of relevant 
networks. 
Søren Jarnvig told us of challenges in Kyrgyz meeting culture, such as people forgetting or 
don’t turning up to meetings, and people not answering emails. He recommended making 
direct contact by simply walking into respondents’ offices and arranging meetings from 
that point. Partly on the basis of this, we decided to utilize the snowball method to 
identify and contact relevant respondents. This method was beneficial since it allowed us 
to explore a field and reach relevant respondents otherwise unknown for us (Bryman 
2004: 100-102). 
As a result of this, we arranged meetings with two Europeans and one student from the 
American University in Central Asia during the first two days in Bishkek before travelling 
to Osh. We interviewed Chiara Fabrizio, program officer at INTRAC1, Thomas Skov-Hansen 
regional representative of Dan Church Aid (DCA) and Dastan Kasmamytov, former student 
of American University of Central Asia and member of an activist network advocating for 
human rights. The first two was selected due to their professional knowledge of 
Kyrgyzstan and network, which proved extremely helpful. Thomas Skov-Hansen 
                                                          
1 INTRAC, International NGO Training and Research Centre, UK based NGO. 
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connected us with DCCA2 in Osh and recommended a range of relevant organizations in 
the area. Chiara Fabrizio connected us with an individual within the UN mission which 
resulted in the interview with Dr. Sabine Mach, representative of UN-Women in 
Kyrgyzstan. Dastan Kasmamytov was a dead end in terms of further contacts, but 
provided us with reflections that have been used in this paper. The DCCA link provided by 
DCA proved fruitful, as they facilitated our translator and revised the list of contacts 
provided by DCA for errors and outdated information. They further provided relevant 
contacts for us in the Osh region, such as Mehr-Shavkat, an NGO working in the rural city 
of Aravan. DCCA was mixed ethnically and did at no time express any political or ethnic 
bias. Whether this was a calculated attitude to display as a result of long cooperation with 
Western agencies or out of sincerity is impossible for us to decipher.  
In Osh we met with a variety of civil society representatives, such as Uzbek community 
leaders in an area affected by the June 2010 Events, a major international agency who 
wished to remain anonymous and a range of advocacy NGOs. Most of the NGOs worked 
directly or indirectly with the June 2010 Events (see table X for overview). None of the 
respondents in Osh recommended contact to local authorities through connection or 
recommendation. They did however recommend other NGOs. Whether this is 
coincidental or a sign of fear of the state is hard to say, but we note the absence of 
relations with the state nonetheless.  
In Bishkek we interviewed students operating a small NGO who worked with the June 
2010 Events, an institute working with regional studies and a representative of a major 
international agency who wished to remain anonymous. All interviews were conducted 
in English. 
 
Name of 
respondent Title Ethnicity Organisation City 
Chiara Fabrizio Program officer Italian INTRAC Bishkek 
                                                          
2 Development and Cooperation in Central Asia. NGO working with international agencies on 
developing non-governmental organizations. 
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Dastan 
Kasmamytov 
Activist, Bishkek Feminist 
Collective Kyrgyz  Bishkek 
Baktygul 
Maksytova Director Uzbek DCCA Osh 
Muharamhon 
Tilavaldieva Director Uzbek Mehr-Shavkat Aravan 
Anonymous   
Unnamed major 
organization Osh 
Akylbek 
Tashbulatov Director Unknown CIP Osh 
Jenishbek 
Toroev Deputy chairman Unknown 
KCT Advocacy 
Center Osh 
Sadykjan 
Makhmudov Director Uzbek Light of Solomon Osh 
Gulgaky 
Mamasalieva Director Kyrgyz Interbilim Osh 
Asel 
Abdrakkhmanov
a Leader of community clubs Kyrgyz Youth of Osh Osh 
Anonymous Community leaders Uzbek 
Elders and 
leaders from 
Uzbek 
community Osh 
Atyrkul Alisheva Director/researcher  
Institute for 
regional Studies Bishkek 
Shakirovna 
Fanilievna Principal Tatar Uzbek School Osh 
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Nadia Pak and 
Karlybach 
Student and researcher at 
think tank 
Korean and 
Uzbek Unity Fund Bishkek 
Sabine Machl 
UN WOMEN 
representative in 
Kyrgyzstan Austrian UN WOMEN Bishkek 
Ulmarova Elmira Director Uzbek Ulybka Osh 
 
Interview guides and transcripts 
The interviews conducted were qualitative in nature and were conducted in a semi-
constructed form. The choice of semi-constructed interviews was made on their ability to 
gain specific information while still being able to pursue relevant topics and points 
(Bryman 2004: 320). We began all interviews with a series of basic questions in order to 
get the respondent comfortable, but later tailored the questions to the specific 
respondent and depending on how the interview developed. The interview guides were 
revised continuously when deemed appropriate. Different types of transcriptions are 
enclosed in the appendix; they are transcribed in the manner relevant for our use. The 
method of transcription for each transcript is declared at the beginning of each one. It is 
important to notice that the transcripts are working papers, links to the actual sound 
recordings are in the appendix.  
Primary and Secondary Data 
Our primary data consists of two kinds of data: Most importantly, the results of our field 
work in Kyrgyzstan. Interviews were the primary product of this, and they are described 
above. Another product, though not used extensively, is observations made on location, 
these are incorporated directly into analysis when relevant economic data, e.g. regarding 
GDP or trends in major imports and exports, provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
and the World Bank. These two institutions are widely used and recognized as accurate 
sources. We use their data to give a picture of the general economic situation in 
Kyrgyzstan. The Economist Intelligence Unit also provided data on technicalities on the 
Kyrgyz political structures and general economic basis.  
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The secondary data used consists mainly of academic texts and books. Some have been 
used to create an image of Kyrgyzstan prior the regime-changes in the late 00s, the 
development in the Kyrgyz socio-politico spheres in post-Soviet times and the recent 
history. These sources are primarily books, while literature on the current state of Uzbeks 
in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan itself are primarily academic articles. Because of the 
actuality of events related to the Uzbeks, articles are the only updated academic sources.   
Choice of Theory and Clarifications 
We use a range of theories and concepts to help comprehend and analyze the situation 
and  reach a plausible answer to our problem formulation. We will here argue for our 
choices and the applicability of the theories. We will also provide a definition of select 
concepts. When relevant this is related to an academic debate.   
Democracy 
The term democracy is widely used in this paper. This calls for a definition, or at least a 
limitation or clarification on the core concepts and how it is used in this paper. It is also 
important to understand democracy in a Central Asian context, since many democracy 
scholars have worked within a Western paradigm. The Central Asian context will be 
expanded on in the chapter on democracy. 
Democracy, as accounted for later, is not a universally recognized rigid concept, but a 
variable term. The most notable scholars in the field of democracy through history are 
Aristotle, Tocqueville and Schumpeter, but more modern interpretations will be included 
too. 
Debates on how to define democracy have taken place at least for 2.400 years and most 
famous of the classic scholars is Aristotle. Aristotle did extensive research on state 
formations in the known world and concluded that a government may consist of one, 
several or many individuals (Cunningham 2002: 7). This government could take six forms 
of rule:  
 Royalty, one individual rules in the common interest 
 tyranny, one individual rules for own interest 
 aristocracy, proper rule by a limited elite 
 oligarchy, improper rule by a limited elite 
 polity, proper rule by the many; democracy, rule by the many in self-interest 
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(Cunningham 2002: 7, Aristotle 2001: 28) 
 
Aristotle considered rule for the common good as the best option and personally 
preferred royalty, but from a realist approach deemed democracy the most realistic and 
least worst option, since it benefitted the most people(Cunningham 2002: 7).  
 
The ambivalence towards democracy is continued by the French scholar Tocqueville, who 
visited the USA, originally to study its penal system, but changed focus to the political 
system (Cunningham 2002: 9). Tocqueville characterized the American system of politics 
as one with “... equality in people’s access not just to voting or holding public office but 
also to economic advantages and culturally, in anti-aristocratic attitudes” (Cunningham 
2002: 8). In spite of the relatively positive view, Tocqueville saw the American democracy 
as a societal formation where a majority exercised a tyranny of the majority (Cunningham 
2002: 8). 
The Austrian economic and former politician, Schumpeter, had reservations as well. He 
was more concerned about the actual dynamics in democracy, which he claimed did not 
represent the people and were mystifying democracy. Democracies are not, Schumpeter 
states, governed by the people or the majority as a whole, but by elected representatives, 
party officials and state apparatus bureaucrats. Furthermore, the common good is non-
existent, since voters tend to vote according to self-interests. (Cunningham 2002: 10) 
Schumpeter’s confidence in the common individual’s ability to contribute valuably 
democracy was also very limited: 
“Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental 
performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and 
analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within 
the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again”  
(Schumpeter 2001: 296) 
Schumpeter argued for democracy being defined by its real appearance and structure, an 
institutional structure where individuals control political decisions on a competition of 
people’s votes. Democracy can be considered a place where free elections take place. 
With that in mind, Schumpeter argues that democracies can be ranked within certain 
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perimeters: availability of qualified politicians, trust in experts and specialists to make 
technical decisions, competent bureaucracy to implementation, tolerant public to one 
another and respect to politicians (Cunningham 2002: 10). 
In general, including the criticism and all the flaws proposed, democracy seems to be a 
societal formation that is characterized by the entire community being involved, each 
citizen or individual being able to be heard and periodically participate in election of 
government, as John Stuart Mill argues (Mill 2001: 59). 
The right to participate meaningfully  includes the right of individuals to express 
themselves without meeting severe oppression or obstacles. In general, the rights of 
citizens in a democracy correlates basically with the democratic rights mentioned in 
article 21 in the Universal declaration of human rights by the UN: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of 
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
 (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in 
his country. 
 (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures.” 
(United Nations 1948: article 21) 
 
The range of criticism displayed will be put into play when revising the situation of 
contemporary Kyrgyz society. Especially the tyranny of the majority is interesting in the 
context of minorities, while democracy itself ascribes tolerance of conflicting opinions.  
 
Transitional Justice 
The concept and theory of transitional justice relates to a country that is dealing with an 
evil past by addressing prior wrongs and producing a sense of justice for the victims and 
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their next of kin. Transitional justice emphasizes various spheres, where justice can take 
place (Teitel 2000, Teitel 2003). 
The purpose of using transitional justice, is to investigate to what extend the state and 
the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan have dealt with the June 2010 Events and in what manner. 
Transitional justice is seen as a way to reconcile after conflicts and is deemed by us a key 
component for the Kyrgyz democracy to address an evil past.  
We primarily use the texts of Ruti Teitel, a political scientist scholar with extensive 
knowledge of justice in transforming societies. She was born in Argentina; a country that 
itself has dealt with the transition from military dictatorship to plural democracy. She is a 
respected scholar in the field and started working with Latin America and the subsequent 
falls of dictatorships there and was then heavily involved in the legal processes in Central 
and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. She produces academic articles and 
books regarding this issue, and holds positions at several Universities such as New York 
Law School, London School of Economics and Hebrew University of Jerusalem3. (Teitel 
2000: vii, 3).  
Nationalism and ethnicity 
“Surely the most tediously repetitive chore facing the writer on nationalism,” writes 
Walker Connor, “is the need to preface each new piece with his or her answer to the 
question: ‘What is a nation?’” (Connor 1992: 47) 
The field of nationalism is so divided between fundamentally different paradigms that 
there is no general agreement on even the most central concepts – not even on a 
definition of nation. Some argue, for example, that ethnicity and nationalism are two 
distinct concepts, others will say that they are two sides of the same. (Smith 1998: 220-
226) 
This means that it becomes even more imperative than normal to clearly present our 
point of departure when it comes to nationalism and ethnicity as it will, to a large degree, 
decide the type of answers we produce.  
Speaking of nations and nationalism, the main division is between perennialism and 
modernism. For many, however, “ethnic identity and community are a major point of 
                                                          
3 See CV profile af the website of New York Law School for more information here: 
http://bit.ly/1bOEkN1  
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reference and a vital building-block for theories of nations and nationalism” (Smith 1998: 
xiii) – and this is also a contested field. Here we find a division between primordialism and 
instrumentalism.   
Starting with the latter, instrumentalism is the idea that culture is completely malleable, 
and that elites can and will manipulate it to mobilise masses in a way that serves their 
political purpose. It is the view that ethnic identity is dynamic, flexible, and variable as it 
changes according to circumstances (Llobera 1999). 
Primordialism, on the other hand, is the idea that group identity is a given and exists in 
all societies. Ethnic bonds are natural and deeply rooted in the history of humanity; an 
essential part of what it is to be a person. This includes language, religion, territory, and 
kinship. Socio-biological primordialists will argue from a biological, evolutionary 
perspective, while cultural primordialists view this primordial bond as a human 
phenomenon (Smith 1998: 223, Llobera 1999).  
In essence, the debate between instrumentalist and primordialists is the argument of 
“elite strategies of cultural manipulation against the power of underlying cultural 
cleavages“ (Smith 1998: 157) This same fundamental divide can in many cases be seen in 
the debate on nations and nationalism in the divide between perennialism and 
modernism. 
Modernism is the view that nationalism is a product of the modern era in Europe. Nations 
are a recent political construction particular to a specific time in history.  They are created 
through nationalism which has mobilized and united populations in a time where modern 
conditions removed the unquestioned legitimized rule of e.g. monarchies and world 
religions. There are three major groups of modernist theories. Social communication 
theories (communication, rituals, and symbols are essential in creating a nation), 
economist theories (industrialism and capitalism is the cause of nationalism), and politico-
ideological theories (stresses the formative role of the state and political elite) The 
modernist view was universally accepted as true until the 1970s and 1980s (Llobera 1999, 
Smith 1998: 4, 159-174, 224) 
Opposed to this, we have perennialism, the view that modern nations are results of 
ethnic ties rather than modernization. Nations are seen as politicized ethnic communities 
that seek their legitimacy from history. The nation has its grounding in time and place 
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because of the common cultural identity of its members, going back centuries or millennia 
– not a natural given, but a human and social phenomenon that ties people together 
through ancestral ties and culture (Smith 1998: 159, 174). 
Smith argues that there are “reductionist tendencies in both polar positions”(Smith 1998: 
157), which “demand clearcut choices between the polar types, or a conscious decision to 
combine elements of each type”(Smith 1998: 24). Smith opts for the latter, arguing that 
one should combine the insights of each paradigm in order to better understand 
nationalism. This leads him to adopt what he calls ethno-symbolism (Smith 1998: 157-
170). 
Ethno-symbolism is the idea that the symbolic heritage of ethnic identities forms the basis 
of nationalism. Ethno-symbolists are particularly interested in how “nationalists have 
rediscovered and used the ethno-symbolic repertoire for national ends, in particular the 
myths and memories of ethnic selection, sacred territory, collective destiny and the golden 
age”(Smith 1998: 224). Ethno-symbolism accepts that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon in general, but also argues that some nations and nationalism existed prior 
to the modern era (Smith 1998: 224-226). While Smith himself sees ethno-symbolism as 
an autonomous paradigm, some see it as a form of perennialism with traces of 
instrumentalism, e.g. the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Miscevic 2010). 
 
We will use an ethno-symbolist framework in our case study of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. As 
Smith heavily relies the work of other theorists in order to present his own unified theory 
of ethno-symbolism(Smith 1998: 224-226), so will we refer to other theorists as well. Our 
choice of ethno-symbolism as theoretical starting point leads us to adopt Smith’s 
definitions of the following key concepts: 
Nationalism: “… an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-
government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it 
to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith 1983: 171). 
Nation: “… a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements of 
culture, a unified economic system, citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of 
solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a common territory” (Smith 
1973: 18, 26). 
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Ethnie: “… a named human population with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, 
having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity” (A.D.Smith 
1986a:32; (Smith 1998: 192). In this text we use the words ethnic group or ethnic 
community in the same sense. 
At first glance, the concepts of nation and ethnie look very similar. To clarify, “nations 
transcend ethnic communities, and can in principle include more than one culture-
community”, since a nation also has, e.g., economic unity and legal systems (Smith 1998: 
195). 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
In order to understand how and why the Uzbeks have reacted to their deteriorated 
situation, we have chosen to use the concepts of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty proposed by the 
economist Albert O. Hirschman. We have chosen this model, because it, despite being 
quite simple, accurately can “explain an array of political, economic, and social 
phenomena,” as the game theorist Scott Gehlbach writes (Gehlbach 2006: 1-2). 
Even though Hirschman often applies his model to economic situations in the private 
sector, i.e. consumers versus producers, his model also applies in other contexts:  
“This book undertakes initially a reconnaissance of these forces as they 
operate in the economy; the concepts to be developed will, however, 
be found to be applicable not only to economic operators such as 
business firms, but to a wide variety of noneconomic organizations 
and situations”  
(Hirschman 1970: 1) 
 Indeed, he did himself apply the model in fieldwork on the fall of East Germany 
(Hirschman 1993). 
Delimitations 
To look into the Uzbeks’ situation in Kyrgyzstan and assessing the democracy we use 
certain theories, concepts and approaches as described above. In order to maintain focus 
and use data available to us, certain limitations have been made. The clan system and the 
economic connotations in the conflict are only superficially touched. These approaches 
would have broadened our scope of analysis and in order to maintain focus and allocate 
our resources efficiently, they are only superficially touched upon. We also limit us from 
including international relations theories and the possible external influence of 
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neighbouring states. To collect reliable data on this subject would have constituted an 
enormous amount of resources, not available for us and it would have removed focus in 
our focus.   
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Contemporary history of Kyrgyzstan 
This chapter presents an overview of the geopolitical and socioeconomic contemporary 
history of Kyrgyzstan, starting from the Soviet Era. This is to provide a general context for 
understanding the conditions of the Uzbek minority today and will allow us to go into 
detail with the specific focus areas later.  
We will look at a select number of points of interest in history. These are: 
 The border drawings made during Soviet time 
 The independence from the Soviet Union 
 Violent episodes related to ethnicity (the 1990 and June 2010 Events and the Aksy 
protests in 2002) 
 The oustings of the two presidents in 2005 and 2010 
Building the borders of a Soviet republic  
In the mid-nineteenth century, Central Asia was ruled by three dynasties whose territorial 
influence changed greatly over time and had little resemblance to the borders of today. 
However, by 1881 the Russian tsarist empire had conquered all of Central Asia and divided 
the area in two geographical units, the Governate-General of the Steppe to the north 
(roughly today’s Kazakhstan) and the Governate-General of Turkestan to the south 
(roughly today’s Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) (Megoran 2010: 
33-37). 
The new division of land did not last long, however. After the Bolshevik Revolution and 
the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, the Central Committee of 
the Russian Communist Party, led by Stalin, began a process of dividing the region into 
national units. Even though nationalism was viewed as a product of capitalism and the 
ultimate goal was a common identity amongst the workers of the world, national borders 
was accepted and used as a mean to obtain the power needed for socialism to 
bloom(Megoran 2010: 37-38). 
Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the Ferghana Valley. Today one of the most 
densely populated areas Central Asia, a hundred kilometers long and about 300 
kilometers at the widest part, it is surrounded by five mountain chains and was therefore 
initially separated from the nomadic tribes that otherwise inhabited Central Asia before 
being incorporated into the Russian Empire (Starr 2011: 3). 
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In the National Territorial Delimination (NTD) in 1924, the valley was split between what 
is today known as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (including the city of Osh). 
However, at that point, the ethnic geography of the valley was highly diverse. People 
identified themselves in many ways, e.g. based on language, village or religion, but rarely 
by ethnicity, as the previous dynasties had been legitimized not through ethnic unity, but 
personal loyalty to the ruler. Naturally, the sudden emergence of new political borders 
did not fit well with the complex and fluid identities of the people in the Ferghana Valley. 
The concept of Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik people were already in use, but in a far more 
fluent, inter-changeable manner than today (Megoran 2010: 33-36). 
The new borders, drawn up in Moscow between 1924 and 1927, were created with three 
things in mind: geographical unity, economic rationale, and ethnic homogeneity. In other 
words, the Soviet border planners faced the challenge of, for example, not splitting up 
water resources and irrigation systems while securing the right spread of central market 
towns and at the same time containing ethnic groups within a contained geographical 
unit.  As with the case of the Ferghana Valley, “it was all but impossible to satisfy these 
requirements because they could often be mutually contradictory” – especially since 
ethnicity was defined by simple censuses in which people were allowed only one choice 
of nationality (Megoran 2010: 39). 
As the political geographer Nick Megoran also writes in an analysis of the Uzbekistan-
Kyrgyzstan border, “all borders are human constructions and as such derive their function 
and meaning from the people they divide” (Megoran 2010: 189). This became apparent 
to everyone in the case of the Ferghana Valley. As the position of borders were ultimately 
decided by the central executive committee of the USSR, there was political battles to 
secure the best areas. Nationality has suddenly become a deciding factor for the political 
elite’s search for influence. 
This led to significant trouble between the Uzbek SSR and the Kyrgyz SSR. For example, 
the city of Osh was initially assigned to the Kyrgyz, but then claimed by the Uzbek SSR 
with the argument that they had a large ethnic majority in the area. On the other hand, 
the irrigation system in Osh was connected to other parts of the Kyrgyz SSR and the city 
was also the administrative and trade center of the southern part of the Ferghana Valley, 
which had already been given to the Kyrgyz SSR. For those reasons, Osh was finally 
allocated to the Kyrgyz SSR. As with the rest of the border drawing process, the end result 
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came from a process founded in ideology and completed with pragmatism (Megoran 
2010: 40-41). 
To this day, the 1375 kilometers long border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is a 
sensitive political issue. First of all, in the USSR infrastructure (e.g. energy, irrigation, and 
transport networks) had been created across borders, and many projects spanned the 
two countries. As Nick Megoran writes, “This meant that settlements of two or three 
generations developed on land that was intended to house only temporary workers.” 
(Megoran 2010: 41) 
On a higher political level, the strained relationship between the two countries 
culminated in the so-called “1999-2000 border crisis”. Along the border, bridges were 
demolished, unmarked mine fields created, bus routes closed, custom controls tightened 
and a large fence of barbed wire along the parts of the border not naturally closed by 
mountains. In some cases, the fence split up villages (and the families within it) in two. 
Several explanations for this escalation have been presented (e.g. a fight over resources 
or attempts to secure capital, goods, and labor), but what is more interesting, in our scope 
of view, is the political fallout in Kyrgyzstan (Megoran 2010: 40-45).  
The first president, Akayev, wanted to create a state that included ethnic minorities - his 
favourite slogan was “Kyrgyzstan is our common home” (Laruelle 2012: 40). There was, 
however, a strong, nationalist opposition who directly opposed this approach. And the 
border crisis was used a lifting pole for their political aim of creating a Kyrgyzstan for the 
Kyrgyz, combining a range of their trademark issues (skepticism towards immigration, the 
multi-ethnic society’s threat to the Kyrgyz cultural legacy, deviant sexualities, and the risk 
of losing territory and resources) into one concrete case (Megoran 2010:45- 48).  
In other words, the border became an issue of nationality:  
“Just as the emergence of the boundary between 1924 and 1927 was 
a political process overseen by Stalin, its solidification in the lives of 
borderland inhabitants in 1999 and 2000 was also, ultimately, about 
the politics of nationality.”  
(Megoran 2010:45- 48)  
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Independence: Building a democracy and market economy 
Before moving on, we should take a moment to dwell on the immediate consequences of 
the fall of the Soviet Union, as it meant colossal economic, social, political and 
infrastructural changes. 
“At the end of the 1980s, Kyrgyzstan was ruled by an orthodox and 
deeply entrenched political elite, which pointed proudly to the 
continuing quiescence of the population of Kyrgyzstan at a time of 
open political opposition in European parts of the USSR.” 
 (Huskey 1997aa: 250, quoted in Cummings 2013) 
Kyrgyzstan was declared a sovereign state on August 31 1991. In October, Askar Akayev 
(b. 1944), a Kyrgyz nuclear physicist and member of the central committee in Moscow, 
was elected president unopposed (two weeks before the election, Akayev had passed a 
law that required any candidate to secure 25,000 signatures within two weeks). At the 
time, he had already been the executive president of Kyrgyzstan for a year, a position 
created by Moscow in an attempt to satisfy criticism from the population after large anti-
communist hunger strikes in Bishkek (Hiro 2009). 
Two years later, in 1993, a carefully drafted new constitution was adopted. Despite strong 
demands from Russian and Uzbek communities, it did not allow double citizenship and 
Russian was not made the an official state language (Hiro 2009). The constitution was, 
however, written in accordance to international standards and emphasized three main 
elements of the new state’s political system: a strong president as head of state, an 
independent parliament as legislative and controlling body of state and a government 
controlled by these two. To the outside world, Kyrgyzstan now had a modern, well-
constructed democratic system that secured the balance of power and rights of the 
people (Kovalskii 2001: 235-236): 
“By formal criteria, the political life in present day Kyrghyzstan 
therefore generally meets the standards and ideals of a democratic, 
law-governed state. The president adheres to the constitution in 
domestic and foreign policy; the multiparty parliament discusses and 
adopts laws freely; the government publicly advances economic and 
political programmes and regularly reports to the parliament. The 
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opposition has its own press, and often criticizes the government’s 
actions. Thus, to the world community, Kyrghyzstan is a kind of model 
to be imitated by its Central Asian neighbours.”  
(Kovalskii 2001: 235) 
However, things were not that simple. The informal political life had a very strong 
influence on the formal system. The technological advancement and cultural 
development during the Soviet rule had weakened the clan system, but it was still there. 
During the Soviet rule, the clans had been removed from participation in the political 
system – now they started to rebuild their former status as the most influential political 
force. The clashes between clans from different regions could – and can still today – be 
seen in a very strong divide between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, with frequent 
clashes between government officials and politicians from different clans. For example, 
President Akayev was part of the Sary-Bagy kin grouping, which inhabited the east and 
north-east of Kyrgyzstan, while the Tugu and Salto clans were strongly represented in the 
state institutions. (Kovalskii 2001: 236-237) 
Despite choosing a democratic parliamentary system, the political parties were, like in 
other former Soviet Republics, weak. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union and its 
Communist Party, the same bureaucratic structures remained as did the same central 
leaders – and so, in reality, no new political players came to power. The creation of a new 
state also emphasized stability which fostered unity in politics rather than competition. 
Finally, clan leaders and business elites defended their power of influence by working 
against the development of new parties (Carothers 2006).  
As Charles Buxton, the author of The Struggle for Civil Society in Central Asia: Crisis and 
Transformation, writes: 
 “The result of this was a political system where the wishes and actions 
of the president dominated life. The presidential apparatus, made up 
of shadowy circles of individuals and groups (personal cronies, 
business elites, clan members) developed inordinate power. The one 
type of party to succeed was the so-called party of power, with only 
the vaguest ideology but a clear focus on national unity and strength.” 
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(Buxton 2011: 83-84) 
What made life even more difficult for the new democracy was the ruined economy after 
the collapse of the USSR. First of all, the country was no longer under centralized planning 
control from Moscow and thousands of industrial jobs suddenly disappeared as the 
subsidies – amounting to 75 percent of the Kyrgyzstan’s total budget– were terminated  
(Hiro 2009). As for the public sector, the government simply did not have the funds to 
employ as many teachers, doctors etc. as during Soviet rule. (Kobonbaev 2007: 315) The 
change must have been hard felt for the population who was used to virtually no 
unemployment under the Soviet system.  
The production focus during the Soviet rule had been extraction of raw materials to be 
used in more developed parts of the USSR. In 1990-91 one third of the workforce was 
employed in the agricultural sector, producing around 40 percent of the country’s GDP 
(Volgina, Gafarly et al. 2001: 252). But as the industry had been sustained by subsidies 
from Moscow rather than in a capitalist system of demand and supply, it was no longer 
possible to sustain it after independence. A year after independence, the total production 
of Kyrgyzstan was only 35 % of the level in 1990.  
This was not a unique situation; the same problems faced other former Soviet republics. 
A 1999-assessment from the United Nations Development Program highlighted some of 
the most striking statistics: in ten years, the number of poor had risen by over 150 million, 
incomes dropped 8 percent, the average inflation rate of Former Soviet Republics in 1990-
1995 was 500 percent and life expectancy dropped rapidly, up to as much as seven years 
for males (Buxton 2011). 
A UN report sums up the challenges after the Soviet collapse: 
 Kyrgyzstan was landlocked and far from major economic centers 
 The industry was heavily dependent on supplies and consumers from other 
Former Soviet Republics 
 The country had only few energy resources and extractable minerals 
 There was lack of many basic state institutions (e.g. a central bank and border 
control) 
 No experience with the democratic state form or macro-economics (Mogilevsky, 
Omorova 2011: 3) 
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In the face of these enormous economic challenges, Kyrgyzstan chose to adopt a market 
economy. Akayev quickly created a national currency (the som), liberalized internal and 
external trade regimes, privatized large parts of the public sector and reduced 
government institutions. Amongst other measures, this meant that 41 ministries were 
reduced to 12 ministries and seven commissions, that price control was lifted from most 
good (fuel excepted), and that a “National Fund for Enterprises” gave interest-free loans 
to small and medium sized companies. In 1995 came further reforms bringing price 
liberalization and deregulation of the public sector (Buxton 2011: 22, 77). All this was 
done with tight coordination of (and to a large degree controlled by) the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). (Volgina, Gafarly et al. 2001: 252-254). 
Despite political willingness, the transformation was difficult. The sheer size of the project 
was the first obstacle, especially because of the lack of strong institutional structure. 
Turning a centralized planning system controlled by Moscow into a decentralized market 
economy demanded high skills and knowledge of economic management – and it was 
simply not there (Volgina, Gafarly et al. 2001: 252-254).  
The economic reforms were not all good: industrial production dropped even more, new 
social welfare programs did not work in practice, food prices rose while salaries did not 
and on top of that the timetables for the change were highly unrealistic (partly caused by 
the pressure of international donors who wanted quick solutions). Also, Kyrgyzstan’s lack 
of natural resources and bad access to foreign trade markets made the reforms a risky 
affair, Buxton argues (Buxton 2011). Another point is made by Maks Kobonbaev, who 
argues that  the quite radical reforms failed to recognize the importance of strong 
institutions. The result was high corruption and noncompliant activities, which now has 
become an integrated part of the political and economic system. (Kobonbaev 2007: 315-
316). 
As Volgina, Gafarly et al. sums up: 
“On the whole, in spite of setting new purposes and tasks, the 
management system continues working in the old manner [..] The 
institution of akimism (relations based on territorial or kin-tribal 
affiliation), which has taken deep root in the republic [..] also hampers 
the development of the new institutional background of the reforms.” 
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(Volgina, Gafarly et al. 2001: 254) 
Another, and very concrete, consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union was the 
privatization of land:  
“For example, in 1992 the level of government expenditures (in 
percent of GDP) was almost twice as much as the level of government 
revenues.”  
(Mogilevsky, Omorova 2011: 13) 
 
The 1990 riots 
There can hardly be any doubt that the economic hardships and institutional troubles of 
the new republic of Kyrgyzstan have both affected the ethnic tensions in the country. 
However, the divide between especially the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks showed itself even 
before then. 
In 1990, the local administration in Osh forced a takeover of land from an Uzbek collective 
and allocated it to Kyrgyz. Violence erupted. Mass-riots and fighting between Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz communities lasted from June 4 to June 10. More than 300 people were killed, 
according to official sources, while other reports put the number between 170 and 600. 
In total, more than 5000 crimes (including murder, rape, pillaging) were committed, found 
the official report of investigation. The majority of victims were Uzbek. The violence came 
to a halt, when the government imposed a state of emergency and deployed military 
troops in the area (Tishkov 1995: 135-136, Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 14-15).   
To understand why violence could suddenly erupt between two ethnic groups who had 
been living alongside each other for many years, we have to look at a number of factors. 
As the anthropologist Valery Tishkov puts it:  
“Under conditions of low living standards, socio-economic crisis and 
political destabilization, interethnic tension erupted due to inter alia 
increasing intergroup competition over resources (land lots), a 
struggle to gain control over power structures, social differentiation 
along 'city-village' lines, unemployment and lack of housing” 
(Tishkov 1995: 134). 
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To begin with, the cultural divides of the Ferghana Valley had concentrated as ethnicity 
had become steadily more important during the Soviet rule, beginning with the border 
delimitation in 1924-1927 and strengthened by forced collectivization in the 1930s. The 
Kyrgyz, as they were now being classified, were semi-nomadic people who moved around 
in the mountainous areas according to seasons. The collectivization and new borders 
meant that they started settling in the Ferghana Valley where the sedentary Uzbek had 
lived for centuries, trading and farming (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 14). 
In the 1980s, there were frequent disputes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz over arable land 
and supplies of irrigation water from the Ferghana Canal. In many urban centers, including 
the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, Uzbeks dominated commerce and trade, which was 
unpopular with the Kyrgyz. Even though the government and public sector mostly 
employed Kyrgyz, the Moscow-controlled factories preferred to employ Uzbeks in manual 
and semi-skilled positions. At the same time, there was high unemployment for Kyrgyz 
youth (not officially, but in effect) (Hiro 2009). 
When Kyrgyz replaced Russian as the official language of the Kyrgyz SSR in 1989, the 
Uzbek community started pushing for an autonomous Osh province, which had the by far 
strongest concentration of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. This was done through the organization 
Adolat, which had 400,000 members. At the same time, the organization Osh Aymagi, a 
Kyrgyz counterpart to Adolat, pushed for better land and economic conditions for Kyrgyz 
citizens. In May 1990, the administration of Osh – which consisted, as mentioned earlier, 
mostly by Kyrgyz – allocated land from an Uzbek-owned collective farm to be used for 
housing projects for Kyrgyz people (Jarnvig 2013: 14, Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 14). 
Almost all violent actions were committed by men (and many by teenagers) but that is 
not to say that women did not take part in the conflict. Rather, women were actively 
involved in mobilizing the men, urging them to defend their fellow men. Interestingly, 
”virtually all Kyrgyz rural dwellers taking part in criminal acts were literate people who 
had finished high school or technical vocational school” (Tishkov 1995). 
48 people, almost all of Kyrgyz ethnicity, were charged after the riots – and 46 convicted. 
Some received suspended sentences while others received up to 18 years in prison. 
Similar conflicts occurred in same period of time in other former Soviet republics, but this 
was the only to be followed by court investigations. One of the reasons was the strong 
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personal initiative of president Akayev (Fumagalli 2007: 211, Tishkov 1995: 134-139). On 
the other hand, the government classified all official studies of the conflict (International 
Crisis Group 2010: 2). 
The June 2010 Events 
Since the violence of 1990, the Uzbeks as political actors have been almost non-existing 
with the exception of a few leaders of some cultural organizations. In 1999, a new political 
party consisting of 95% Uzbeks fiercely denied being Uzbek, and there have been no calls 
for autonomy since 1990. The memory of this conflict, argues Matteo Fumagalli, has been 
used by Uzbeks leaders to downplay the focus on Uzbeks rights in politics as they feared 
further incidents (Fumagalli 2007: 578). 
When fighting broke out in the city of Osh in 2010, the memory of the riots 20 years earlier 
was brought to mind again. There had been noticeable tensions between Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek people since the president, Bakiyev, had been overthrown in April after which 
Uzbekistan closed the borders, leaving thousands of labor migrants and cross-border 
traders without income (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 16-17). At the time, more than 
700,000 Uzbeks lived in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, accounting to over 40 percent 
of the population in the city of Osh (International Crisis Group 2010). 
The frequency of disputes (commonly over issues such as taxi fares and gasoline prices) 
had been growing each month. Nobody had died, however, before Saturday night on June 
10, when arguments at the 24 Chasa Casino in the center of town triggered a crowd of 
around 3000 Uzbeks. Police failed to contain the crowd (despite firing shots into the air, 
as told by many Kyrgyz people, or into the crowd, as told by Uzbek people). According to 
the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC)4, there were records of Kyrgyz using weapons 
and vehicles taken from the police, who did not intervene (Kiljunen 2011). 
In the following four days, the riots spread to other cities in the south. About 470 people 
were killed. Of those, 74% were Uzbek of which 7 out of 10 had gunshot wounds. 1900 
people (57.7 percent Kyrgyz, 40 percent Uzbek) received medical care, according to 
official records, although the actual number of injuries is much higher, according to the 
                                                          
4The KIC was sanctioned to investigate the riots by the government. The commission was led by 
Finnish Kimmo Kiljunen. Although the report is widely recognized as the most exact assessment 
of what happened, Mr. Kiljunen was declared persona non grata, when the report was published.  
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KIC. There were several cases of rape and gang rape of women, at least 20 and mainly of 
Uzbek women (Solvang 2011, Kiljunen 2011). 
The riots also meant that hundreds of thousands of people left the area. 110,000 
displaced persons, mainly women and children, entered Uzbekistan during the conflict, 
although 78,000 returned two weeks later, motivated by “intense pressure” from the 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities. 300,000 were internally displaced in Kyrgyzstan of which 
more than half remained displaced in January 2011 (Kiljunen 2011: 59-61). The Uzbeks 
were not the only minority targeted by angry mobs of Kyrgyz. In the northern city of 
Tokmok, shops owned by ethnic Dungans and Uighurs were robbed on April 9, injuring 11 
people. A café was burned down in neighboring town, killing two people. When 
firefighters arrived to put out the fire, they were attacked by the mob. In another 
northern city, Mayevka, hundreds of Kyrgyz citizens attacked Russian and Meskhetian 
Turkish citizens, looting and setting fire to their homes. They demanded that their land 
would be redistributed to Kyrgyz citizens, as “Kyrgyz land should belong to the Kyrgyz 
people” (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010: 19). 
The fighting was fueled by a massive mobilization of worried relatives from the 
mountainous villages west and east of Osh: “Outraged by the violence, and concerned 
about relatives in the city, crowds of ethnic Kyrgyz from neighboring villages descended 
on Osh city [and] joined locals in Osh in looting and torching Uzbek shops and 
neighborhoods, and sometimes killing Uzbeks they encountered.” (Solvang, Neistat et al. 
2010: 23, Kiljunen 2011) The popular rumor, which was spread by cell phones, was that 
Uzbeks had attacked a dormitory, where they raped, mutilated and killed Kyrgyz women 
(International Crisis Group 2010).  
Nobody has been able to ascertain exactly who was behind the organized attacks. The 
explanation for the violence offered by the government (through the State National 
Security Service) is that three parties had conspired to create unrest in the south: the 
Bakiyev family, Uzbek cultural organizations, and Islamic terrorists. This is almost surely 
false (International Crisis Group 2010). 
However, one of the reasons for the targeted violence towards the Uzbeks might be 
connected to the ousting of president Bakiyev in April 2010 and the power struggles that 
followed. Supporters of Bakiyev, plentiful in southern Kyrgyzstan, took over government 
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offices, organized large demonstrations and sometimes took part in violent clashes with 
authorities (Trilling, Dalbaeva 2010). The local administration in Osh – still dominated by 
Kyrgyz – sought the help of the Uzbek community to counter the Bakiyev loyalists. Leaders 
of Uzbek communities issued letters of support of the interim government and helped 
organize crows to recapture buildings that had been taken over by supporters of Bakiyev. 
This brought the Uzbeks back on the political scene. As an Uzbek leader, former member 
of parliament and successful businessman, Kadyrjan Batyrov, said in a on May 14:  
“[F]rom now on, Uzbeks who live in Kyrgyzstan will not remain in their 
role as observers … we want to actively participate in the governance 
of the state, in the political life of Kyrgyzstan … the Uzbeks stood hard 
on their position and fulfilled their part in fighting the previous 
regime.”  
(CA-News 2010) 
This political activity sparked a reaction with many Kyrgyz. For example, newspapers print 
articles calling for the expulsion of Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan in order to secure land for the 
Kyrgyz people (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010). After the violence in Osh later that year, 
Batyrov and five other Uzbek community leaders were charged in absentia5 for spreading 
separatist propaganda, inciting ethnic hatred, and organizing clashes between Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz in the June events (RFE/RL 2011, Forestier-Walker 2013). 
This is not the only case of Uzbeks being targeted not only in the conflict by angry mobs, 
but also in the aftermath by the judicial system. The Human Rights Watch has reported 
65 cases of torture and ill-treatment of detained Uzbeks by the authorities following the 
riots– and that almost 85 percent of the detainees were Uzbek (Solvang 2011). According 
to the Human Rights Watch, the use of torture has become more common since 2010 
(Solvang 2011: 1) 
The riots highlighted the continuing ethnic divide between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, not 
only within the population, but in official institutions as well. The report from the KIC 
highlights the following: 
                                                          
5Batyrov is now a refugee in Sweden 
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“The events must be viewed in the context of the historical and 
political background of the region, particularly the relationship 
between the communities of ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. In this 
regard the KIC notes the under-representation of ethnic Uzbeks in 
public life and the rising force of ethno-nationalism in the politics of 
Kyrgyzstan. The KIC notes further the power vacuum and consequent 
political rivalries, fragile state institutions and the weak rule of law in 
southern Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the 7 April overthrow of the 
Bakiyev government.” 
(Kiljunen 2011: ii) 
As opposed to the conflict in 1990, there has been a lack of fair trials or attempts at 
securing judicial justice after the violence in 2010. Statements extracted under torture 
have been used in court and statements retracted after use of torture, Human Rights 
Watch has reported. The prosecutor’s office denied to investigate claims of torture – in 
one case even after a judge had acquitted a defendant’s statement because it was made 
under torture and despite a special request for investigation made by the court (Solvang 
2011: 2). 
Another issue has been the lack of fair trials: 
“The extremely hostile and violent environment in which the trials 
have occurred undermined defendants’ fair trial rights. Audiences in 
trials have frequently threatened, harassed, intimidated, and even 
physically attacked defendants, their relatives, and lawyers and other 
observers before, during, and after court sessions…  This charged 
atmosphere meant that lawyers were reluctant to ask witnesses for 
the prosecution tough questions; Uzbek witnesses were afraid to come 
to court to testify; and defendants and lawyers were afraid to 
insistently raise allegations of torture and ill-treatment.” 
(Solvang 2011) 
105 cases related to the June events have gone to trial. Only two of the convicted have 
been acquitted, and only one of the convicted was Kyrgyz (Amnesty International 2013). 
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The odds were bad to begin with, if the ethnicity of the members of the judicial 
institutions has anything to say. In 2011, there were only one Uzbek amongst the 110 
judges in southern Kyrgyzstan and only one Uzbek investigator in the entire national 
security agency. 
The Aksy events, the Tulip Revolution, and the 2010 regime change 
In the beginning of his presidency, Akayev was viewed by western world leaders as a 
democratic reformer who would lead Kyrgyzstan towards a westernized market economy 
and democratic state. But during his rule, he began a gradually more authoritarian course. 
Already in January 1993, eleven opposition parties issued a joint warning against the 
return of dictatorship. Akayev worked more with technocrats than democrats, they said, 
and in effect had no close advisers from democratic parties. This was not an ungrounded 
fear as, for example, opposition parties were kept under surveillance, usually by phone-
tapping. (Hiro 2009) 
In December 1995 new elections were held. Akayev would have preferred to extend his 
term of office through a referendum, but pressure from IMF prompted an election. 
Akayev ran against two opponents and received 72 percent of the votes from a turnout 
of 86 percent of the population. Secure in power for five years, Akayev began 
monopolizing power, suppressing opposition and independent journalism, and enriching 
himself and his family through state corporations. (Hiro 2009) 
Akayev initiated an amendment of the constitution that reverted to a single-chamber 
parliament, gave more power to the prime minister and in general was biased towards 
the president. It was endorsed by a large majority of the population (and was welcomed 
by Putin), but very unpopular with politicians (Hiro 2009). So while Akayev started out as 
a president committed to openness and reforms, he moved in a more authoritarian 
direction, especially after year 2000, causing his popularity to drop.  
“Above all he failed to stem corruption or develop the rule of law. 
Instead the political system was increasingly dominated by his family 
and a small group of supporters”  
(International Crisis Group 2005: i). 
Protests in the Aksy district in the Jalalabad region of southern Kyrgyzstan marked the 
downfall of Akayev. In one protest in 2002, police shot and killed protesters. The killing of 
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unarmed citizens was an enormous shock to everyone. These were the first deaths of this 
kind since independence, and they seriously undermined the president’s authority 
(Buxton 2011). The Aksy riots are worth to dwell on, because they in many ways 
precipitated the Tulip Revolution of 2005,  in which Akayev would be overthrown of 
power. As the professor in political science Scott Radnitz begins his paper on the subject: 
“Before there was the Tulip Revolution, there was Aksy” (Radnitz 2005: 405). 
Aksy is one of the poorest districts in the region: In 2005, it had the highest rate of 
unemployment, second-lowest average income, and the least amount of arable land. 
Most people earn a living through sheep raising, growing potatoes, or collecting berries 
and nuts. Teachers and doctors make around 15 USD a month. People generally felt a 
sharp decline in living standards after the fall of the Soviet Union (Radnitz 2005: 404-408). 
In early 2002, a national newspaper reported that 75 percent of the population lived in 
poverty and that the country had the lowest growth rates in Central Asia (Buxton 2011).  
The observations of everyday life in Aksy made by Radnitz serves as a good impression of 
the life of many Kyrgyz (most of the population lives in rural areas), although perhaps a 
bit caricatured: 
“Daily life for a resident of Aksy is monotonous and depends on how 
much work is available on one’s plot of land. It consists of waking up 
at dawn and beginning daily chores; men milk the cows and women 
clean the house. Breakfast consists of tea and bread. If the weather is 
good and work needs to be done, men spend the day working on the 
farm, ploughing their land with the aid of a horse, chopping wood, 
fixing equipment in need of repairs and feeding the animals. Women 
spend their day cleaning, cooking, and tending to babies and animals. 
Lunch and dinner consist of eggs from people’s own chickens, fried in 
cottonseed oil, and soup, heavy with potatoes and fat. Throughout the 
course of the day, neighbours stop by, come in for tea and talk about 
neighbours, weddings, farming and politics. If there are enough hands 
around the farm to perform the labour, older men drink large 
quantities of cheap vodka starting early in the morning, alone or with 
friends. They spend the rest of the day sleeping or wandering around 
the village. Mothers work especially hard to find suitable husbands for 
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their daughters, beginning in the girl’s late teens, seeking someone 
with a decent source of income and whose family they know…  The day 
ends when it becomes dark.” 
(Radnitz 2005: 410) 
In February 2002, Akayev decided to return 95,000 hectares of land to China, who had 
been claiming it for many years. He did not inform the parliament. Azimbek Beknazarov, 
a member of parliament representing the Aksy district, accused Akayev of treason and 
sought to charge him with impeachment. Beknazarov was then brought into custody, 
charged with abuse of power. This led to mass demonstrations in the Aksy district – not 
led by elite players, but rather by respected community men, including teachers and in 
one case a bus driver, who mobilized, organized, and led the masses. Demonstrations 
continued and strengthened through February and March. When rumors spread on 
March 17, that Beknazarov had been beaten in prison, police lost control over the angry 
crowd. They fired shots, killing six and wounding 12 (Radnitz 2005). 
Scores of protests all over the country in the following months did not prompt a change 
in policy or other measures. In the following years: 
 “Akaev increasingly seemed out of touch with reality, promoting 
unrealistic programs and not understanding the socioeconomic crisis 
besetting the population. He had always been much weaker in the 
south but was losing popularity even in the north [..] He had not only 
lost popular support, but also was increasingly losing the backing of 
key national and regional elites, who were irritated at family control 
of the economy and rising corruption.”  
(International Crisis Group 2005) 
In some way, Akayev’s democratic and economic reforms formed the foundation for the 
Aksy events and the Tulip revolution that would oust him from power. 
 “… democratic reform and market-led development generated both 
the space and motivations for revolutionary action. Democratic 
reforms created the possibility of political dissent, while neoliberal 
policies resulted in economic decline and social dislocations in which a 
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temporary coalition between rural poor and dissenting political 
leaders was born” 
 (Pelkmans 2005: 147). 
The Tulip Revolution and the Bakiyev era 
It was no real surprise, then, when street protests in March 2005 ousted president Akayev 
from office in the so-called Tulip Revolution, which gave way to a coalition of individual 
politicians6and small parties.  
General elections had been held the month before. At that time, the opposition had 
joined forces, merging eight parties into the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), led 
by former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, Akayev’s son and daughter, 
Aidar and Bermet, through electoral malpractice, were the big winners in the first round 
of the general election, which lead to demands of Akayev’s resignation. Large protests 
erupted, mainly in the south, and the government lost control of up to two thirds of the 
country as government buildings were occupied and local administration leaders held 
hostage (Hiro 2009, International Crisis Group 2005). 
 “[Aksy had] demonstrated that people were not powerless in the 
autocracies of Central Asia. [They] honed their mobilizational skills in 
Aksy and maintained the possibility of creating a new mass 
mobilization if the regime would not allow systemic political change. 
The rigged elections of February 2005 gave them the opportunity. 
Finally, ordinary people, fed up with corruption and the slow course of 
change, were aware of Aksy’s success in winning concessions from the 
government and were emboldened to use those means again.” 
(Radnitz 2005: 422-423) 
Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolution not only opened up the question about power in Central 
Asia, but it also provided many opportunities for criminals to make informal alliances with 
political figures, often on a clan basis. The anti-corruption intent of the new government 
was hampered by rent-seeking elements within its own ranks. 
                                                          
6 Many of these later returned to overthrow Bakiyev in 2010 
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On 24 March 2005, scores of protestors invaded the White House in Bishkek with little 
resistance (security forces and political allies had already left), forcing the Akayev to flee 
the country. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the prime minister under Akayev, was chosen as acting 
president by the interim government. He used this position to place his close allies in 
central leaders (International Crisis Group 2005) and in this way slowly and consolidated 
his position as the sole leader of Kyrgyzstan within 2006. (International Crisis Group 2010)  
Bakiyev had in reality created a Kyrgyz version of what could be seen in Kazakhstan: a 
consolidation of the national elite and a parliament filled with wealthy businessmen 
(Buxton 2011): 
“As President Bakiyev settled into office in 2005, his political system 
became increasingly synonymous not only with him, but with his 
family, and especially his younger son, Maxim, described by an adviser 
to the presidential administration as a “pathologically” acquisitive 
young man who “dreams of wealth and power”  
(International Crisis Group 2010: 2) 
Bakiyev slowly placed his family members in charge of corporations. In short, “The Bakiyev 
regime developed a system which, in exchange for unquestioning loyalty, allowed key 
players near total impunity, and thus boundless opportunities for corruption.” 
(International Crisis Group 2010: 5) This was especially true in the southern parts of 
Kyrgyzstan, the home base of Bakiyev.  
In 2007, Bakiyev created AkZhol, a new political party. He, or his son Maxim, wanted to 
create a one party system, inspired by what Putin had created in Russia. Two opposition 
parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, were allowed a limited 
representation in parliament (International Crisis Group 2010: 2-3)Opposition politicians 
and journalists were intimidated by the national security forces and some were 
imprisoned – and in some cases probably assassinated. This caused further social 
discontent (Temirkulov 2010: 595, International Crisis Group 2010: 4). 
The Bakiyev family wanted to get rich – quickly. Energy was sold to neighbours even 
though Kyrgyzstan had 12 hour power cuts most days during the winter 2008-2009, 
because of low water levels in the Toktogul reservoir, the main source of energy. The 
official selling price was set low at 1.3 cents per kWh, but in reality, the Bakiyev family 
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most likely sold it at the market price of 4.5 cents per kWh and skimming the overhead. 
2008 was a rough year for the population as there were also food shortages. 
(International Crisis Group 2010: 2-3) The Bakiyev family was also suspected of working 
with drug dealer networks, securing the passage of heroin from Afghanistan to Europe, 
Russia, and China (International Crisis Group 2010). 
In 2009, Bakiyev introduced a new form of state: The Consultative Democracy which laid 
almost supreme power in the hands of the president and a select group of advisers.  Later 
that year, a new presidential guard service, “The Lion”, trained by US trained special 
forces, who could be used to defend the presidency against demonstrations 
(International Crisis Group 2010: 7-8).  
2010 regime change 
By 2010, there was a strong public resentment of Bakiyev – and for good reasons. Cries 
for lower energy prices, the removal of the Bakiyev family, and privatization of state 
companies led to large demonstrations (Temirkulov 2010: 596-597). 
So even though, the Bakiyev family appeared be firmly in power (Kurmanbek Bakiyev won 
elections in 2009 with more than two thirds of the votes), the obvious personal 
enrichment had angered both the population, high standing business men and political 
opponents. Also, Russia was becoming increasingly impatient with the lease of the Manas 
Military Base to the Americans; especially since Bakiyev had promised not to renew the 
lease in exchange for a 2 billion loan. The result was that hundreds of thousands of 
migrant workers had to return to Kyrgyzstan, and that state controlled Russian media, 
widely consumed in Kyrgyzstan, began a series of critical stories of the Bakiyev family, in 
effect fuelling public anger with the president (Huskey, Hill 2011: 876). 
Rallies against the government began on April 6 turned into violence, which in turn led to 
large demonstrations in front of the White House in Bishkek. The private guards of 
Bakiyev attempted to disperse the crowd by shooting into the crowd.  In total, 86 people 
died in the street (International Crisis Group 2010: 4, Huskey, Hill 2011). 
Bakiyev and his closes relatives fled Bishkek on April 7, returning to their home town, 
Teyit, in southern Kyrgyzstan. From here he tried to regain support, but without luck. In a 
last attempt to gain support, Bakiyev tried to stage a demonstration in Osh on 15 April, 
The Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan   Andreas Winther Rohde & Troels Kølln 
43 
 
but was chased away by supporters of mayor Myrzakmatov. He then fled the country and 
received asylum in Belarus (International Crisis Group 2010: 7). 
This marked the end of an era “associated with popular alienation and disillusionment 
brought on by blatant criminalization, increased authoritarianism, centralization, and 
perceived economic downturn” (Cummings 2013: 611). 
The interim government declared that it would remain in power for six months, the time 
needed for securing a new constitution as well as fair elections for parliament and 
presidency. There was a general feeling of anxiety, however, as people were unsure of 
both of the power and the will of the interim government (as most of it consisted of 
members of the parliament). The skepticism was strengthened by increasing claims of 
corruption and seizures of private businesses, a practice known to be used by Bakiyev 
(International Crisis Group 2010). 
The new constitution was passed in a national referendum on June 27. Compared to the 
previous, it confined the powers of the president, who will now sit for a single six-year 
period. The president cannot initiate legislation (but has veto rights), and has no power 
of the executive body of the government. (Fumagalli 2007: 867) 
When elected, Atambayev underlined that he seeks to unite the country, between north 
and south and between different ethnic groups (Fumagalli 2007: 867).  
The interim government did not have an easy task at hand. Bakiyev had left behind a 
bankrupt state with widespread corruption and crime. The economy was failing and the 
infrastructure of the country was falling apart. In 2011, Almazbek Atambayev, who had 
led the coalition government, won the presidency representing the Social Democratic 
Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK). He received 62,5 percent of the votes in an election that is 
widely regarded as fair and free. There were 16 contenders for the presidency (Fumagalli 
2007: 864). 
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Kyrgyzstan today 
The current state of Kyrgyzstan is still heavily influenced by the June 2010 Events, and 
ethnicity plays a still more important part in various spheres in Kyrgyz society. The 
distribution of ethnic groups has changed noticeably in recent history, with the Kyrgyz 
ethnic group increasing in most regions, leaving Bishkek as the only place in Kyrgyzstan 
with a substantial amount of non-Asian ethnicities (Wachtel 2013: 4). Combined with 
institutional shortcomings, corruption and regional grievances, this form a series of 
obstacles for Kyrgyzstan as a nation.  
 
On the UNDP Human Development Index, Kyrgyzstan ranks 125 of 187 countries, close to 
neighboring countries. With democratic features such as almost free elections, close to 
free internet and a range of civil liberties (though restricted) Kyrgyzstan is considered a 
hybrid regime by the Economist Intelligence Unit and is ranked 106 of 165 on their 
democracy index in 2012 (International Crisis Group 2012: 12, The Economist 2013). This 
is more democratic than neighboring states, and Kyrgyzstan can be viewed as a quasi-
democratic island surrounded by authoritative regimes.  
 
 “Lack of stability in public and political, social and economic life of the country creates 
problems provoking protests among the population,” states an OSCE report from last year 
(Azimov, Sayakova 2012: 10). The rule of law, the state acting according to and upholding 
the law effectively, is described as presently existing but not fully implemented and 
facilitated by the state structures: “… one observes passiveness of law enforcement 
agencies in those cases when it is necessary to undertake actions to stop a breach of law” 
(Azimov, Sayakova 2012: 10). 
 
On the international NGO Transparency International’s perceived corruption index 2013 
Kyrgyzstan scores 150 out of 175 country entries. This ranks Kyrgyzstan within the lower 
part of the index. The neighbouring Central Asian scores roughly similar with Kazakhstan 
in the lead ranking 140, Tajikistan slightly lower at 154, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
both rank 168 (Transparency International 2013: 3).   
 
The conditions of democracy and the ethnic policies pursued both officially and 
unofficially are strongly intertwined; ethnic tension strongly correlates with the creation 
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and use of the common historical myth around Manas and the introduction of high 
language requirements in the political sphere. We argue that the criticism of democracy 
presented in the clarification – in particular the argument that people vote for own 
interests and that the common good is neglected in the process - clearly has a raison 
d’être when considering that the increase in politics founded in ethno-centric nationalism 
does not benefit the common good  - that is if the Uzbeks are considered part of the 
common good, of course.  
 
Politics 
The current political structures are based on what is supposed to be popular elections, a 
relatively new concept to Kyrgyzstan. Forms of competitive elections took place in the 
1990s but have not been fully accepted as following international standards. This was 
exemplified by the arrest of three opposition politicians in 2000 on what is widely 
considered fabricated charges. As Congressman Christopher H. Smith is quoted in a 
Human Rights Watch report:  
 
"[president at the time] Askar Akaev, by falsifying elections and repressing 
freedom of expression, has made normal politics impossible in Kyrgyzstan."  
(Human Rights Watch 2002: 1)  
 
The culture of irregularities and instability has remained after the Tulip revolution, in 
which President Bakiyev from the south formed a political tandem with the Prime 
Minister Felix Kulov from the north. Their partnership ended just a year later, however, 
when Bakiyev went solo in 2006 and was left with a substantial amount of power. A major 
reason for the collapse of the political partnership - beyond personal dislike - was the 
regional divide. Politicians from the north were more inclined to pursue an agenda of 
cohabitation with ethnic minorities while politicians from the south stressed a more 
excluding nationalist approach. This difference in ethnic policy is to some extent still valid 
today (Huskey, Hill 2011: 876)  
 
Politicians rely on voters from either the north or south to a wide extend. As Table 1 
shows, the President received the majority of his votes in Northern provinces while the 
closest contenders received almost none in Northern provinces. 
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Table 1. The distribution of votes in the northern and southern Kyrgyzstan at the October 
2011 Presidential elections. (Fumagalli 2012: 866)   
 
 
The current political situation is instable with a recent history of riots and popular risings 
toppling governments. The current government attempts to maintain a fragile stability in 
a tense ethnic and regionalized climate. The ethnification of culture and politics is 
considered by observers to have accelerated after the June 2010, even though it began 
much earlier. In 2000, language tests were required by presidential candidates effectively 
eliminating 12 of 19 candidates in the multinational state (Human Rights Watch 2002: 1).  
Further language requirements are to be implemented in 2020, demanding specific 
language skills of public employees, effectively barring Russian and Uzbek ethnic 
individuals from getting positions within the state, as stated by an unnamed member of 
staff in a major international organization working directly with the government on new 
legislation. This development takes place while Kyrgyzstan becomes more ethnically 
homogenous due to the fact that many ethnic groups leave the country. Mostly Russians 
and Germans leave permanently in high quantities, while the Uzbeks primarily leave for 
temporary migrant work in Kazakhstan and Russia (Wachtel 2013: 4). 
The Uzbek participation in politics is close to non-existing and has been since the June 
2010 Events. This is partly due to the nationalist climate and partly due to the defensive 
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isolation of the Uzbek community. As one Uzbek community leader told us in an 
interview, when asked if the community participated in politics: “…we cannot be in 
politics” (Uzbek Community 0:10:36). Uzbek political leaders have almost entirely left 
politics after the June 2010 Events or left Kyrgyzstan (Fumagalli 2012: 866).  
 
This is a widespread phenomenon, effectively leaving politics to ethnic Kyrgyz:  
“Because everybody on top are Kyrgyz people, like army, politics, 
everything is in their hands. There is no Uzbek people within this 
sphere. This is why we can say that the power is in their hands.”  
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:15:14) 
 
Some talk of the Uzbeks being forced out of politics and other spheres of public life. As an 
anonymous representative from a major international organization told the International 
Crisis Group:  
“… space and voice in the community appears to be progressively 
limited, which affects their enjoyment of all human rights – civil, 
cultural, economic, social and political.” 
(International Crisis Group 2012: 9) 
It is important to notice that influence from Uzbek community advocates on the political 
processes is close to absent. Protests are not rare in the political landscape, and there 
have been recurring protests since change of power in 2010, and they have remained 
relatively peaceful considering the violence in June 2010 (The Economist 2013).Today, the 
Prime Minister Zhantoro Satybaldiev, the former mayor and governor of Osh, is Kyrgyz. 
 The current political superstructure in Kyrgyzstan consists of a unicameral chamber, the 
Jogorku Kenesh, which is elected for five-year terms. It has 120 seats (in 2010 increased 
from 90). According to law, three quotas apply for parties when participating in elections: 
15 percent of minorities, 30 percent quota for women and 15 percent quota for youth 
(Interview with Machl 00:11:04).  
However, this is not fully enforced and individuals can be put on the list without having a 
chance of assuming office. In the 2010 elections only two Uzbeks received were elected 
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to the 120 seat large parliament (Fumagalli 2012: 866). The intention, however, is deemed 
progressive by the director of UN Women in Kyrgyzstan (Interview with Machl 00:11:04).  
The current government is the result of a three party coalition with a small majority of 69 
seats. The government tries to maintain stability in the policy making process by courting 
nationalist sentiments in order to avoid conflict with ultra-nationalists and further violent 
ethnic clashes.  
The nationalist party Ata-Jurt, not in government, often relies on public pressure in order 
to achieve political victories. This happened in June 2013, when the party mobilized 
people to illegally set up roadblocks on the road between Bishkek and Osh in order to get 
three Ata-Jurt deputies – charged with attempts to overthrow the government - released 
from jail. The deputies were released shortly after, when they were sentenced to 
significantly lesser charges than originally (The Economist 2013). 
This is a testimony of the fragile balance the government attempts to uphold between 
rule of law and public pressure. However, the nationalists are the only political force 
currently able to conduct such effective public displays of discontent. The analysis from 
The Economist Intelligence Unit is clear: “Both the light sentences handed to them and 
their early release stem from the authorities' fear of aggravating inter-ethnic tension, but 
highlight the fragility of state institutions” (The Economist 2013). 
Stability is the key word in current policy making, both on the political and 
macroeconomic level. The government’s hope is this will help strengthen the economy 
and prevent regional and ethnic conflict. Yet it is difficult for the national government to 
assert authority, especially in the south, because of fragile state institutions (The 
Economist 2013). 
The maneuverability of the government is also restricted by the heavy reliance of the 
state budget on the incomes from gold export and remittance from migrate workers. It is 
also limited by insecurity over food production and energy shortages (The Economist 
2013).  
A major political issue is the Kumtor gold mine, which is currently a joined venture 
between a Canadian firm and the Kyrgyz state. But there have been frequent demands of 
nationalization of the gold mine.  (The Economist 2013). 
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On the international level, President Atambayev has tightened the relationship with 
Russia after many years of bad relations during the Bakiyev era, and Kyrgyzstan is 
expected to join the Russian customs union in 2015 which currently consists of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus. Another example of the strengthened relationship with Russia 
includes the 15-year lease renewal of the Kant military base in Kyrgyzstan to Russia. In 
return, Russia cancelled large portions of Kyrgyz debt to Russia (The Economist 2013). The 
geopolitical situation should be seen in context with the reluctance of Kyrgyzstan to 
renew the lease of the Manas Airbase to America. The airbase has been instrumental to 
the American military presence in Afghanistan. In a similar deal, Kyrgyzgaz, the national 
gas company, was sold to Russian Gazprom on the promise that Russia in return provides 
big investments in infrastructure (The Economist 2013).  
Regional relations are fragile, with border conflicts involving all of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors: 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, China and Tajikistan (The Economist 2013). Uzbekistan, the most 
populous state in Central Asia, and with the most advanced military and security 
apparatus in the region besides Russia, remained passive during the June 2010 Events, 
and is not expected to intervene internal Kyrgyz affairs in the near future. At the same 
time, there is a worry that a new president in Uzbekistan could choose a more nationalist 
approach to politics and attempt to exercise influence over  Kyrgyzstan in case of new 
ethnic violence or perhaps even deploy a military intervention (International Crisis Group 
2012: 4, Wachtel 2013: 10). 
The public sector 
The problems for the Kyrgyz public sector and legal system began almost immediately 
after independence as a result of poor design and failing results, which led to a re-
emergence of the clan system in some regions as a substitute to the failing state (Wachtel 
2013: 3). The poor conditions were exacerbated in the June 2010 Events which caused: 
 
 “… an acute humanitarian crisis in the southern part of the country. 
Many components of the education, health and other key public 
services, which are considered in this study, have been severely 
damaged.”  
(Mogilevsky, Omorova 2011: 2) 
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The poor state functions lead to overloaded infrastructure and many individuals were not 
able to receive basic rights in the fallout of the June 2010 Events. In Kyrgyzstan, most 
public services are tied to a particular place of residence in a system inherited from the 
Soviet era, called the Propiska. This includes medical care, payment of pensions, and 
voting rights. The process of issuing propiska when moving residence is, however, 
extremely complicated and often involves bribes. Many Uzbeks have experienced 
problems with the propiska as well as registration of new or reconstructed houses 
(Wachtel 2013: 10). This means that many people, especially those internally displaced 
after the June 2010 Events, are living without proper documentation (Fabrizio 0:03:56, 
OSCE ODIHR 2001). 
  
Lack of documentation is a serious obstacle and challenge for both state and individuals, 
since funding from the central government to local authorities is based partly on the level 
of population, as stated by Jenishbek Toroev, representative from KCT Advocacy center: 
“All population comes to the cities, and when the budget is divided in 
the White House [the parliament], they are giving money to the people 
that registered in those regions, and all of them are in the cities, trying 
to get services from the city…”  
(Interview with Toroev 0:11:30) 
Torture and extrajudicial measures by law enforcement and public judicial are also posing 
obstacles to the democratic situation and feeling of justice amongst minority group. 
Torture is widespread and unclear legal language on lawyers’ rights to meet with clients 
is being bend by law enforcement, e.g. interrogation becomes interviews or 
conversations. Such manoeuvers limit the detainee’s rights and access to legal counsel. 
This also means that constitutional provisions and obligations to international law are not 
adhered to (Human Rights Monitoring 2012: 11). 
 
Torture is comme il faut within the justice system and is believed to provide the basis for 
nearly all convictions in criminal cases (International Crisis Group 2012: 10). The state 
apparatus remains ineffective or unwilling to pursue repeated complaints by detainees 
regarding torture and general ill-treatment while in custody including attempts to extract 
confessions through these means (Amnesty International 2013a: 1)  
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One example is the 18 year old pregnant woman Anna Ageeva, who was detained by 
police on murder charges. She was handcuffed to a radiator and kicked repeatedly in the 
stomach in an attempt to extract a confession. When lawyers from an NGO filed 
complaints regarding the woman’s treatment, they were dismissed by the authorities as 
“absurd” (Amnesty International 2013a: 1). 
 
Legal obstacles were also present regarding the reconstruction of the damaged houses 
and offices after the June 2010 Events: as this female Uzbek director of a small NGO 
working with disabled children stated: 
 
 “My agency was also assaulted during the June events. It was looted. 
But the government didn’t help me, because the president of the 
agency was Uzbek. Only international organizations helped me to re-
establish, to recover.”  
(Interview with Elmira 0:28:37) 
 
The Kyrgyz government has not limited its discrimination or prosecution of ethnic Uzbeks 
to the time surrounding the June 2010 Events or the immediate aftermath. Currently, five 
asylum seekers in Russia are being demanded extradited for alleged participation in the 
June 2010 Events by Kyrgyzstan. Defense lawyers of the asylum seekers have pointed out 
irregularities in the legal material produced by Kyrgyz authorities. The Amnesty 
International and the European Court of Human Rights have intervened, effectively 
hindering extradition of the pursued individuals so far (Amnesty International 2013b: 2).  
 
State institutions are almost only employing ethnic Kyrgyz. On the other hand, many 
Uzbeks work in precarious jobs, not saving up pensions as is done in state jobs. Uzbeks 
have been forced out or have withdrawn from local government, some with the rational 
that participation would only legitimize an entity that does nothing for them. 
(International Crisis Group 2012: 12, Interview with Uzbek Community 0:07:26) 
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The lack of pension contribution could create conflicts in the future since it would 
impoverish non-Kyrgyz when reaching old age. As Uzbek community leaders told us: 
  
“... there are no people here who are working in state institutions… Nobody is 
working in a registered job. It is a private job like in construction, houses, drainage 
works, but it is all private.”  
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:07:26) 
The pension individuals receive at the pension age (63 for men and 58 for women) is 
around 50 USD a month which is low compared to living costs. If one has not saved for 
pensions, as is the case for many Uzbeks, the social allowance from the state is 17 USD 
(Mogilevsky, Omorova 2011: 7).  
Culture and religion 
Culture has become highly politicized in Kyrgyzstan recently as is the trend  in the entire 
Central Asian region – especially when it comes to language policies, which split the power 
elites between homo- and heterogeneity (Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012).  
In 2010, all Uzbek language TV-stations in Kyrgyzstan were taken over in the wake of the 
riots and turned into Kyrgyz speaking TV-stations (International Crisis Group 2012: 14). 
According to the international watchdog Freedom House, the internet  is also affected by 
state regulation in that access to certain pro-Uzbek sites are denied (Freedom House 
2013: 462, 471). The press freedom is also partly free; the international watchdog 
Reporters Without Borders states in their annual report on press freedom, that 
Kyrgyzstan “still face important challenges concerning media independence and the 
working environment of journalists” (Reporters Without Borders 2013: 15). 
On the religious scene, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan are higher degree than before turning to a 
stricter interpretation of Islam, which was mostly attributed to a reaction to corruption 
according to International Crisis Group (International Crisis Group 2012: 12).This began 
already before the June 2010 Events. The more recent shift to religion could also be seen 
as a result of the state’s inability to address the June 2010 Events. One Uzbek professional 
told the International Crisis Group:  
“During the fighting, people phoned Bishkek and elsewhere, to see if 
anyone was coming to help. No one was. They stopped calling, and 
turned in on themselves [and] to Allah.”  
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(International Crisis Group 2012: 12) 
   
Remittance is a central part of the Kyrgyz economy and made up 27.6 percent of GDP in 
2011 (The World Bank Data 2013), rising 15 percent last year to USD$ 1.8 billion. The 
remittance comes from 250-500.000 labour migrant workers primarily in Russia and 
Kazakhstan, amounting to 12-15 percent of the total labour force. This makes Kyrgyzstan 
heavily dependent on these two countries and the currently deteriorating economy in 
especially Russia and China could have a large effect on the Kyrgyz economy (Mogilevsky, 
Omorova 2011: 7-16, The Economist 2013). 
 
Part conclusion 
While our original thought was that democracy would provide rights for all citizens and 
respect for the human rights, democracy has been a vehicle for ethnic chauvinism. 
Political parties have used nationalism in order to mobilize large voter segments, but at 
the same time alienating a relatively large part of the population. The people voting for 
the nationalists vote within their own narrow interest as ethnic Kyrgyz (International 
Crisis Group 2012: 12). For the common good – meaning all the inhabitants within the 
Kyrgyz Republic - such a voting pattern is not desirable. As Wachtel argues, Kyrgyzstan is 
becoming closer to a traditional European nation state in matters of ethnic homogeneity 
and perhaps this would in time stabilize the country, since it happened in Europe (Wachtel 
2013: 11). The criticism of democracy as a concept, as we have described earlier, argues 
that it would allow people to become primitive and accept irrational arguments valid. To 
some extent, this seems to be the case in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The duality of the democracy is that in one way it has allowed individuals to influence the 
political sphere and in another way it has severely limited Uzbeks in doing so. The political 
development has also failed to establish a stronger rule of law and consolidate the state, 
which was weak from the moment of independence. This could fuel a development where 
a political paradigm shift is impossible unless something fundamental happens that 
changes the basis of how politics is conducted. Andrew Wachtel, scholar at the American 
University of Central Asia located in Bishkek, argues that: 
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 “Thus, unless they can provide a different and workable model, the 
international community should not be surprised that the Kyrgyz are 
pursuing the ethnic-state approach. And instead of asking the Kyrgyz 
to do the impossible, perhaps they should focus on mitigating the 
inevitable fallout that occurs in the wake of such development.”  
(Wachtel 2013: 5) 
 
The path suggested here opens for the possibility of displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of non-Kyrgyz citizens. But when members of the political elite openly can 
pursue ethnically biased politics and be successful, Schumpeter’s argument that everyone 
votes in order to his own interests without regard for the common good seems relevant.  
 
When the former Mayor of Osh repeatedly referred to the Uzbek minority, who had lived 
in Osh for generations, as a diaspora, it clearly showed that the structural integrity of the 
multinational Kyrgyz Republic was in jeopardy. Not so much that a single politician could 
assert nationalism so powerfully in his political platform, but that it was not effectively 
refuted from Bishkek who was at that time promoting inclusiveness. The same happened 
for the rumours that Uzbeks tried to secede from Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (International Crisis 
Group 2012: 6). 
  
Regarding the existence of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the female Uzbek director of a small 
NGO working with disabled children said:  
” Of course, there is a democracy in Kyrgyzstan. However, it is only for 
certain ethnic groups. Not for everybody.”  
(Interview with Elmira 0:29:59) 
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Nationalism and ethnic identity 
There can be no doubt that the strong Kyrgyz nationalist sentiments that have developed 
continuously in Kyrgyzstan after the fall of the Soviet Union have had very real 
consequences for the Uzbek minority, as we will argue in this chapter.  
Smith argues that ethnies are “central to the understanding of why and where particular 
nations are formed, and why nationalisms, though formally alike, possess such distinctive 
features and contents.” (Smith 1981: 66) For this reason, we will first do an analysis of the 
Uzbek ethnie and then uses that knowledge to analyze the role of nationalism in 
Kyrgyzstan. We will go into detail with the divide between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnies, 
the nature of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan and how it has changed the way Uzbeks are 
viewed and treated by the Kyrgyz. Finally, we will look at how the Uzbeks have chosen to 
respond to the discrimination they perceive and we will identify a possible way forward.  
 What marks the difference between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz ethnies? 
 How have sentiments and ideologies of nationalism affected the Uzbeks? 
 How have Uzbeks reacted to this? 
 What would it take for the situation to improve? 
What marks the difference between Uzbek and Kyrgyz ethnies? 
Before going into a detailed analysis of our case, let’s take a moment to expand on the 
idea of ethnies and ethno-symbolism. When all comes to all, Smith sees ethnicity as 
presumed kinship. He quotes Donald Horowitz:  
“Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually 
carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, 
however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the 
concept of ethnicity.” 
(Horowitz 1985, quoted in Smith 1998: 165) 
Horowitz argues that most people are born into an ethnic group, making ascription by 
birth the defining element of ethnicity. This makes it difficult or impossible to change 
ethnic groups, as opposed to other groups of identification (Horowitz 1985: 57–60, 77–
81, 141-143). Or put in a simpler fashion, as Michal Billig does: 
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“One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day 
after; one can even dress in Chinese and Turkish styles. 
But being Chinese or Turkish are not commercially 
available options.” 
(Billig 1995: 139) 
So, then, ethnicity is something that is hard to change. But what characterizes ethnies? 
Smith and his colleague John Hutchinson (1996) identify six traits of ethnies. 
1. A common proper name, that identifies and express the essence of the 
community 
2. A myth of common ancestry (including common origin in time and place)which 
leads to presumed kinship 
3. Shared memories of a common past, e.g. heroes and historic events 
4. Common culture, e.g. language, religion, and customs 
5. An idea of link to a homeland (physical occupation or symbolic attachment) 
6. A sense of solidarity  
(Hutchinson, Smith 1996: 6-7) 
We see here a strong emphasis on links into the past as the common denominator for the 
ethnie. Smith puts particular emphasis on social memory in the form of symbols. He 
quotes the work of John Armstrong, who sees symbols as a form of concentrated and 
highly effective communication of the unique culture and fate of the community over 
centuries (Armstrong 1982: 6-9). 
In addition to symbols, Armstrong speaks of mythomoteurs, constitutive myths 
that entrench sets of values and symbols over time. Mythomoteurs enhance 
feelings of a common fate for the individual members of the group (Armstrong 
1982: 9, 283, Smith 1998: 182-183). 
Taken together, myths and symbols serve the role of infusing a sense of union for the 
members of the ethnie: 
“Ethnies are constituted, not by lines of physical descent, but by the 
sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny, i.e. by lines 
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of cultural affinity embodied in myths, memories, symbols and values 
retained by a given cultural unit of population.” 
(Smith 1991: 29) 
We should also add that language plays an important part, too: “Language has always 
been – and still is – central to notions of identity as a crucial element in the collective 
cultural perceptions of many communities”  (Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012: 4). 
Here we might add the words of Stuart Hall. In his essay Cultural Identity and Diaspora, 
he speaks of the common “oneness” of a group, a feeling of collective self that is based 
on history and shared cultural codes: 
“… our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences 
and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people', with 
stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, 
beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history. 
This 'oneness', underlying all the other, more superficial differences, is 
the truth, the essence..” 
(Hall 1993: 223) 
Smith’s concept of symbols and myths that span centuries and refers to some form of 
core culture and heritage, is a variant of cultural primordialism. It is important to note 
that it is the sense of affiliation with the past, not  not an actual physical kinship, that is 
the basis of the ethnic ties (Smith 1998: 187, 192). Here Smith relies on the work done 
before him by Clifford Geertz, who writes that many of us simply believe and feel the 
power of primordial history (Geertz 1963). 
 
Symbols only perform these functions as long as they resonate with the group. If they do 
not, they cannot unite its members. However, when they do, “Successful official symbols, 
partly because they seep into the subconscious, discourage the two-way flow of debate 
and modification” (Cummings 2013: 613). Also, symbols are not static artifacts of heritage 
and tradition; they also have a significant role in creating new meanings and images of 
memories that are shared by the members of the ethnie (Smith 1998: 187). 
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Again we turn to the words of Hall: 
 
“… instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which 
the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of 
identity as a 'production', which is never complete, always in process [..] 
We should not, for a moment, underestimate or neglect the importance 
of the act of imaginative rediscovery which this conception of a 
rediscovered, essential identity entails.”  
(Hall 1993: 222-224) 
Even though Smith is careful not to use the word imagined, as it strongly connected to 
the noted work of Benedict Anderson (1983), a strong modernist, it seems an appropriate 
choice of words. The connection with the past is indeed imagined. It is, however, an 
imagination based on concrete communication of the past, i.e. symbols and myths. 
 
In summary, symbols and myths and the communication of those two within the ethnic 
group are of the highest importance in shaping ethnies (Smith 1998: 183, Armstrong 
1982: 283). Smith writes:  
“Symbols represent to particular human groups distinctive shared 
experiences and values, while myths explain to them the meanings of 
those experiences and exemplify and illuminate those values.” 
(Smith 1998: 186-187) 
It must also be noted that physical appearance naturally plays a role in ethnicity, but is 
obviously not the deciding factor; not all people of same physical appearance are in the 
same ethnic group, and not all members of an ethnic group look the same. 
Analyzing the symbolic borders  
Fredrik Barth stresses that we as researches should focus on the social and symbolic 
boundaries that define the group, not the cultural stuff that the borders include (Barth 
1969: 15). As Smith argues, ethnies are defined by what differentiates it from outsiders 
(Smith 1998: 187).  
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This touches on the concept of the Other, which we will discuss later, but to begin with, 
let’s look at how the Uzbek ethnie is differentiated from the Kyrgyz. This is important as 
it affects the role that Uzbeks take in society – and therefore also their response to, and 
influence on, discrimination.  
 
On the general level, we see a clear presence of all the six markers of ethnies described 
by Hutchinson & Smith (1996): 
 
1. A common name: Uzbeks are called just that by everyone in Kyrgyzstan. The name 
of ethnicity is even mentioned on the national ID card. 
2. A myth of common ancestry: There is a clear story of the Uzbeks as descendants 
of a sedentary people. 
3. Shared memories of a common past: Especially the June 2010 Events have 
created a strong memory of injustice. 
4. Common culture: The Uzbeks speak their own language, are more traditionally 
practicing Muslims and live everyday life mostly within their own communities.  
5. An idea of link to a homeland: The Uzbeks have a clear perception of Osh and the 
Ferghana valley in general as a place originally inhabited by Uzbeks. 
6. A sense of solidarity: The Uzbeks have a strong communal feeling of solidarity 
based on a feeling of injustice and underlined by their living in distinct areas, 
mahallahs. 
 
 
1) Common name 
This one is fairly straight-forward. The Uzbeks go by that name, both within the ethnic 
group as well as in Kyrgyzstan in general. The use is even institutionalized; the national 
identification cards clearly state both citizenship and nationality. We were told that 
Uzbeks changed their official nationality in order to prevent discrimination (Maksytova 
1:39:08).   
 
However, we should remember that it does not necessarily have to be that way. Indeed, 
says Baktygul Maksytova, it wasn’t so before independence:  
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“… during the Soviet Union, we didn’t know who was who. There was 
only people… We didn’t know who is Uzbek, who is Kyrgyz.” 
(Maksytova 0:35:15) 
We need to take Maksytova’s words with a pinch of salt, however, as it was precisely the 
Soviet Union who introduced the use of ethnicity as a clear-cut defining name of identity. 
Before the border delimitation of 1924, people did not usually use those words to 
describe themselves – or at least in a much more flexible (and thereby less marked) 
manner (Megoran 2010: 33-36). 
2) A myth of common ancestry, and 5)  An idea of link to homeland 
In the case of the Uzbeks, the tales of ancestry and homeland are closely connected. 
When we asked the elders in a Uzbek community why Kyrgyz and Uzbek people live in 
separate neighborhoods, they answered: 
“It has always been like that. If you go back through history, Uzbeks 
have been living here. Of course, there were some Russians and Tatars, 
but 80 percent have always been Uzbek.”  
“My grand, grand, grand, granddad was living in the house, where I 
live. So you can see that for more than 300 years it was only Uzbek 
people living here.” 
“This city was full of only Uzbeks before 1960s. After 1960s Kyrgyz 
people started coming to this area. Before this date, there were no 
Kyrgyz here.” 
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:12:03, 0:14:07, 0:13:48) 
 
We see here a clear link with both family ties going many generations into the past as well 
as an idea that Uzbeks have always lived in “this area” (meaning the Osh region or, more 
likely, the Ferghana Valley). 
 
3) Shared memories of a common past 
There can be no doubt that the all-overshadowing common memory of the past is the 
violence that took place during the June 2010 Events. As we will argue later, even though 
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this memory is still very recent, it is likely to live on for a long time, because there is no 
feeling of justice within the community; no transitional justice after the events.  
To get an understanding of why this is, we need only imagine the feelings of sorrow, 
anger, and injustice that lie underneath this story that was told to us in an Uzbek 
mahallah: 
“You know, in the place you are standing now was an old school and 
in this yard my son-in-law was killed… After my son-in-law was killed, 
my brother was killed. All the parts of his body were cut off and 
thrown… I wrote a statement at the time my brother and son-in-law 
was killed, but I got a paper saying that these two men died during the 
riots, and then they just closed the folder. They didn’t even try to find 
the people who did it.” 
(Uzbek Community 0:33:44) 
There are many other stories like this. Thousands of homes and businesses were burned 
to the ground and 470 Uzbek were killed over a span of few days. That is a lot of grieving 
parents, children, siblings and neighbours. It is not hard to imagine that this memory will 
sit deep in the hearts and minds of those affected. 
This memory has manifested itself in the daily language in Osh. Nadia Pak from the 
volunteer based NGO Unity Fund, who visited Osh after the June 2010 Events to do 
humanitarian aid, says that in Bishkek “we always call it ‘the tragedy’ and ‘June events’ in 
some reports… But in Osh it was called war, because they could see a war” (Pak, Karlybach 
0:29:27). 
To follow the spirit of Anthony Smith, the word ‘war’ is in itself a symbol: it contains the 
suffering felt and intensifies the feeling of kinship through the pains the ethnie has had 
endure. 
The violence in 1990 must also have been in the minds of the Uzbek ethnie and 
strengthened a feeling of unity in history. As Pak wonders: 
“… in 1990, there was a first rise and maybe the children of those who 
passed away during that time kept a memory. Kept a memory of the 
violence between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz.”  
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(Pak, Karlybach 0:19:44) 
There are other stories that create a feeling of unity amongst Uzbeks. The most commonly 
heard from Uzbeks is that, unlike themselves, Kyrgyz people cannot grow plants, only 
herd sheep, since they used to be nomads. The reverse prejudice is that Uzbeks are 
greedy, because they have always been traders (Pak, Karlybach 0:24:23). This story is one 
of a presumed kinship that stretches far into the path.  
 
4) Common culture 
To begin with the language, the Uzbeks speak Uzbek while the Kyrgyz speak Kyrgyz or 
Russian. While both languages originate in the Turkish language family and are 
understood in approximately the same way Norwegians and Danes understand each 
other, it is still a clear marker of difference as language is a highly politicized issue. We 
will discuss this subject more in the second part of this analysis when looking at the role 
of nationalism at a state level. 
 
The Uzbeks live in certain neighborhoods of Osh city, the mahallahs, where most of both 
everyday activities and celebrations take place. This creates an environment where every 
activity is in essence Uzbek, since it is done independently from spheres of other ethnies. 
As one community leader says: 
 
“We don’t really have contact with Kyrgyz people today. But 
sometimes we have to have some contact… for example when we are 
getting gas to our mahallah… And only in these kinds of situations we 
get contact with them.”  
(Uzbek Community 0:05:33) 
There is of course a mix of Kyrgyz and Uzbek people in the public sphere, especially in 
markets and other business districts, public transportation and workplaces in the private 
sector. Some people argue that Uzbeks apaand Kyrgyz people have different their facial 
features , with Uzbeks often looking more Turkic and Kyrgyz more mongoloid. However, 
it is disputed if it really is possible to see the difference. What is a clear difference, 
however, is the clothing they wear.  
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Normally, traditional clothing is only worn during holidays, but both the Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
national hats are popular year-round (Tilavaldieva 0:54:41). Uzbek men often wear the 
tubeteika, a round, flat Islamic hat, while married women wear white headscarves. Uzbek 
men, however, are often more noticeable by what they don’t wear: the kalpak, a tall 
Kyrgyz hat which is becoming highly popular with especially Kyrgyz youth and a very 
potent symbol. To cite a Kyrgyz blogger: 
“Traditional clothes of the Kyrgyz people is important part of material 
and spiritual culture of the nation, and it is closely linked with the 
country’s history… Since ancient times the Kyrgyz people reflected the 
nation’s coloration and traditions in their appearance… Traditional 
costume of the Kyrgyz men and women has remained unchanged for 
700 years. Moreover, with the passing of the years it becomes more 
valuable and popular. The most popular Kyrgyz headdress is Ak kalpak. 
Light-colored felt hat, embroidered with patterns in contrasting colors 
– it is the ancient Kyrgyz conical hat” 
(Kadyrkulova 2013) 
This description illustrates the strong and conscious symbolism ascribed to clothing. By 
wearing easily recognizable symbols in the public spheres, one quickly communicates a 
connection to a specific ethnie. In the case of Uzbeks, they are actually being defined as 
an ethnie group as much as by the symbols of the Kyrgyz as by their own symbols, since 
they stand out by being different.  
 
6) A sense of solidarity 
“.. every day we are thinking about those families whose breadwinners 
are sitting in prison for nothing… periodically we collect money to buy 
bread and we send it to prison.” 
(Uzbek Community 0:25:27) 
This shows the solidarity of the Uzbek ethnie in general. They do not send bread to 
individual family members or even to members of the mahallah; they send bread to 
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Uzbeks in prison. Add to this the feeling of commonly experienced hardships in the 
violence in 1990 and 2010, and you have the basis of a strong feeling of solidarity. 
Put together these six characteristics, and we find a clearly named Uzbek ethnie, which 
has a strong sense of solidarity based on a common myth and idea of homeland in the 
Osh and Ferghana Valley and which was strengthened by the 1990 and 2010 events. 
Furthermore, there are physical symbols in public life that characterize not just the Uzbek 
ethnie, but also the Kyrgyz in the sense that the Uzbeks are set them apart from the 
majority in the sense that they are different. 
This feeling is likely to be strengthened by geographical border drawing. The city of Osh 
is placed literally a stone’s throw from Uzbekistan, the reason for the large population of 
Uzbeks with Kyrgyz citizenship. It is not that Uzbekistan is a place that Uzbeks want to go, 
but rather that it makes their foreignness so much easier to ascribe them. They are 
foreigners. As Sabine Machl notes: 
“When the Soviet Empire fell apart, they simply woke up on the wrong 
side of the border.”  
(Interview with Machl 0:16:59) 
It is this foreignness, this difference, this idea that Uzbeks are the Others, that we will take 
a look at in the next section.  
Us and them: How the Kyrgyz view the Uzbeks as the Other 
So what is the concept of the Other? How is it connected to ethnicity and nationalism? 
And what does it have to do with the conditions of the Uzbek ethnie in Kyrgyzstan? 
Let us begin by returning to Armstrong (1982). Armstrong highlights the dichotomy of  us 
and them and through that the exclusion of ethnies. He stresses the importance of 
symbols as markers of us and them; symbols are central to ethnic identification because 
they signal that there is a difference between the two, both to outsiders and members of 
the ethnie (Armstrong 1982: 6-9). 
What Armstrong speaks of here is what others have called the Other or Otherness. The 
concept of the Other is, put to the head, the psychological mechanism that allows Kyrgyz 
people to treat Uzbeks as second-rank citizens (or rather, perhaps, as non-citizens). As 
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Simone de Beauvoir has famously written, “no group ever sets itself up as the One without 
at once setting up the Other over against itself” (Beauvoir 1953: xxiii). 
So why are the Uzbeks seen as Others? To answer this, we will look to Erving Goffman 
(1968) and what he calls Stigma. In short, we will argue that the clear markers of the 
Uzbek ethnie have been turned to a form of collective. But let’s first expand on the 
concept of stigma. 
Stigma is “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”, causing reduced status of the 
stigmatized in the relationships with others (Goffman 1968: 13-14). There are three types 
of stigma of which the third is “the tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion, these being 
stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all 
members”(Goffman 1968: 14). 
One example of stigma in a physical sense springs to mind: the burned Uzbek houses. In 
the June 2010 Events, Uzbek living quarters and community buildings were set on fire 
(Kiljunen 2011, Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010) – which, naturally, is in the conscience of local 
Uzbeks (Uzbek Community 0:24:01). Walking around in the city Osh, one can see that 
many of these buildings are still visibly damaged – some are black of sod, others barred 
with wooden poles and yet others have smashed windows and broken roofs (as opposed 
to the intact, clean Uzbek neighbourhoods). These are physical, visible marks of where 
the Others live have been created; a symbol; a stigma. 
When the stigma is permanent, it can result in spoiled identity, which in turn means that 
the stigmatized person cannot achieve full social acceptance. This is because “Society 
establishes the means of categorizing persons… We lean on these expectations that we 
have, transforming them into normative expectations” (Goffman 1968: 11-12).  
This is, in other words, what we have already described in terms of the six markers of the 
Uzbek ethnie – except that we have so far described the Uzbeks mainly as seen by Uzbeks. 
Now we need to turn the point of view to the Kyrgyz majority. After all, it “is not to the 
different that one should look for understanding our differentness, but to the ordinary” 
(Goffman 1968: 152).  
So what happens to people with spoiled identities when they meet normals, the word 
used by Goffman to describe the non-stigmatized, the majority? How do normals – the 
Kyrgyz, in our case – view the stigmatized?  
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“He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had 
anticipated… we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. 
On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through 
which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances. We 
construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and 
account for the danger he represents, sometime rationalizing an 
animosity based on other differences, such as those of social class.” 
(Goffman 1968: 15) 
Goffman speaks of creating an idea of inferiority, reducing the Other to something not 
equal to ourselves, something “not quite human.” We sensed this feeling in a young 
Kyrgyz leader from a local NGO, especially in the following part of our interview with her 
(IW denotes the interviewer, AA the interviewee, Asel Abdrakhmanova): 
IW: Can you see a difference between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek youth? 
AA: Yes, I see a colossal difference. 
IW: Can you come with some examples or explain a little more? 
AA: The young Kyrgyz people are more open. They are more interested 
in education. They can express their opinions, express themselves… 
They strive for something. Uzbek communities are isolated. They are 
not confident in themselves. They are closed. It is hard for them to 
open up. They do not value education. Very few of them try to reach 
higher education. 
IW: Few? 
AA: Yeah, few. They are religious and conservative… it is prohibited for 
girls to be in public spaces. They cannot say what they think. They have 
many stereotypes in the Uzbek community. They have stereotypes 
about life… 
IW: Why is there this difference, do you think? 
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AA: I see the problem in education. Problem in culture and in 
mentality. 
(Abdrakhmanova 0:12:23-0:16:35) 
We see here a very strong normative expectation (as Goffman would say) of how 
Abdrakhmanova expects Uzbeks to be: closed, not appreciative of education, and 
stereotypical. This is caused by their culture and their mentality, i.e. they are themselves 
the cause of these bad character traits. Uzbeks obviously belong to another, lower social 
class than the Kyrgyz, thereby branding them with a stigma that will be transmitted 
through lineages and effectively reduce their life chances. On the other hand, she 
describes the Kyrgyz, the normals, as open, interested in education, and ambitious.  
The conversation also highlights an interesting point made by Johnson:  
“… members of privileged groups are culturally authorized to interpret 
other people’s experiences for them, to deny the validity of their own 
reports, and to impose their views of reality.”  
(Johnson 2006: 109) 
Stigma sometimes turns into fear, for both the stigmatized and the normals. Many Kyrgyz 
are afraid that that the Uzbeks will create an independent state (Alisheva 0:17:51), feeling 
that the Uzbeks, “they are dominating us, in our country” (Machl 0:19:40). As Chiara 
Fabrizio notes, that in the eyes of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks “are foreigners, they don’t belong here, 
they have their own country” (Fabrizio 0:12:57).  
As an example of how deep the us and them divide between the Kyrgyz ethnie and 
minorities run, it is worth noting that the violence in 2010 seemed to be organized and 
well-coordinated, targeting specific neighborhoods and with strategic precision (e.g. 
waiting to attack until night time) – as opposed to the 1990 violence, which was 
spontaneous in nature and with a somewhat arbitrary selections of victims. Violent 
attacks also happened with the acceptance of local authorities who, at the least, did not 
resist the seizing of automatic weapons, ammunition and Armoured Personnel Carries 
(APC)7. In some instances, the APCs drove around to unarmed Kyrgyz crowds and 
                                                          
780 of these weapons and around 19,000 rounds of ammunition have not been recovered 
(Kiljunen 2011: ii) 
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distributed firearms, sometimes by men in camouflage clothing. As the KIC report states: 
“The failure of members of the security forces to protect their equipment raises questions 
of complicity in the events, either directly or indirectly” (Kiljunen 2011: 32, iv). 
Today, the fear is, naturally, connected to the June 2010 Events. It is important to note 
that even though it was almost exclusively Uzbeks who were being attacked, it was not 
just the Uzbeks who felt afraid; so did the Kyrgyz. Two university students handed out 
humanitarian aid after the conflict had settled down and noted that:  
“[The Kyrgyz] were saying, ‘We have lived with our Uzbek neighbors 
our whole life, we know them, but in that kind of situation we are even 
afraid to go outside… we are even afraid of those people.“ 
(Interview with Pak, Karlybach :14:23) 
This fear seems to have taken root. Even today, many Kyrgyz people are afraid to go to 
the Uzbek neighborhoods, the mahallahs. (Kasmamytov 0:43:38-0:46:00). However, the 
fear from the side of the Uzbeks is not articulated, not even to mention a discussion of 
what it is based on (Uzbek Community, Jarnvig). 
As we know, one way of unifying one’s own ethnie is through myths. The many popular 
stories of how the Uzbeks were the real perpetrators in 2010 show this clearly. We spoke 
to one Kyrgyz man in Bishkek, an entrepreneur and business owner, who told us the 
following when asked about the June 2010 Events: 
“It's like a movie. The Uzbeks recorded professional videos which were 
shared on the internet so it looked as if the Kyrgyz started everything.  
“They had been planning it for 20 years. The first time was in 1990, the 
next time in 2010, and in 20 years they will do it again. My Uzbek 
friends told me about it. It was very well planned. 
"We cannot understand why they do it. Because in Islam, the most holy 
rule is: Do not kill other people. Muslims do not kill other Muslims. So 
why do they do it? They want their own country. They want to take 
over. But it is impossible mission, because if they invade Bishkek, we 
have the Russian army to help.  
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“They [Uzbeks] get the newest Kalashnikov rifles from Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan, better than the Kyrgyz army, and they kill all the Kyrgyz 
when they were sleeping. They came from the mosques, yelled Allah 
Akbar and killed all the Kyrgyz.  
“The Uzbeks are immigrants. In Osh, 50 percent are Uzbek. They come 
here because of democracy. In Uzbekistan, it is very poor and very bad 
if you want to do any business." 
(Mederbek 2013) 
This story is in no way singular; we heard similar explanations from a number of different 
people. It tells us much about the perceived distance between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek 
ethnies. In order to be so strongly positioned as an Other who wants to take over the 
country of the normals, a strong sense of stigma must be present. 
We argue that this concept of the Other began with the riots in 1990, when a forced 
takeover of land from Uzbeks to be used for housing for Kyrgyz, evolved into violence. 
More than 300 people, mostly Uzbeks, were killed, often in very brutal ways. According 
to documents from the court hearings, almost all the convicted perpetrators said that 
their motive was the mass murders of Kyrgyz done by Uzbeks in a neighboring region – a 
rumor that quickly spread from mouth to ear in the days of violence. This rumor helped 
sustain a group thinking in which individual reflection gave way to collective solidarity and 
union and “played a significant role in securing both in-group mobilization and the 
escalation of the conflict.”(Tishkov 1995: 138-147) 
The overweight of Uzbek victims illustrates the clear cultural element of the conflict. This 
could also be seen in the concrete violent acts – the worst crimes were actually committed 
by Kyrgyz men on horses, an animal strongly connected to Kyrgyz nomadic culture. As 
Tishkov writes: 
“Horse-riding is commonplace in Kyrgyz cultural tradition as well as in 
some professional activities in rural Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz are 
believed to be skilled riders, and many cultural values and merits are 
connected with the horse. This cultural component distinguished them 
from the Uzbeks, who have traditionally been engaged in land 
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cultivation and commerce. It was precisely the horse that was used in 
committing the most brutal murders of Uzbeks involved in agricultural 
work in remote and secluded places… Clearly, for young Kyrgyz males 
the horse has a symbolic value as well as being a real means of 
asserting their superiority over members of another ethnic group, for 
it allowed them to chase Uzbeks 'like rams'.”  
(Tishkov 1995: 137-138) 
In this quote, “brutal murders” refers to acts such as forcing a man to the top of mountain 
in order to throw him into a 100 meter steep abyss, dragging roped children in a line after 
a horse while whipping them, and repeatedly raping women over a period of 24 hours 
while constantly changing locations, e.g. keeping her locked inside stables. And to “chase 
Uzbeks ‘like rams’”, the expression being used by a defendant, almost literally shows the 
strong image of  a stigmatized Other that is not quite human. 
Ultimately, the strong stigmatizing is also being felt by the Uzbeks as they also begin to 
see the Kyrgyz as a different entity that is difficult to relate to.  As an Uzbek community 
leader expresses it: 
“Of course, we are from one religion, we are all human beings. But I 
guess we just think differently, and that prevents us from 
understanding each other. I don’t know.” 
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:38:20) 
So how will the Other react to this strong marginalization? We imagine that two things 
might happen: The Other must somehow react to their deteriorated situation – exit, flee, 
or accept the situation – while the normals, the majority ethnie, will use the strong sense 
of unity in the face of a common enemy to consolidate its power. One way to do this is 
through nationalism, which we will now move on to. 
How is nationalism influencing the conditions of the Uzbeks? 
So far we have concerned ourselves with the relationship between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz as 
ethnies, but not with how this shows itself in the democratic system of Kyrgyzstan. In this 
chapter, we will argue that strong nationalist sentiments have had a strong influence on 
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political life and in effect consolidated power with the Kyrgyz ethnie while marginalizing 
the Uzbek ethnie.  
First, let’s recall our definitions of a nation as:  
“… a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive 
elements of culture, a unified economic system, citizenship rights for 
all members, a sentiment of solidarity arising out of common 
experiences, and occupying a common territory.”  
(Smith 1973: 18, 26, quoted in Smith 1998) 
And nationalism as:  
“… an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of 
self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of 
whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 
‘nation’.” 
(Smith 1983: 171, quoted in Smith 1998) 
In this we recognize on a national level what Goffman said when he spoke of 
stigmatization as a way of “removing these minorities from various avenues of 
competition” (Goffman 1968: 165). Nationalism is one expression of this removal. One 
Kyrgyz human rights activist, critical of the nationalist movement, notices this in the 
nationalist discourse: 
“… by showing the Kyrgyz ethnic superiority, they basically imply that 
others … they shouldn’t be in power.” 
(Kasmamytov 0:16:24) 
The concept of the Other is central to the formation of a strong, Kyrgyz-centered 
nationalist development in Kyrgyzstan. Connor argues that nationalism doesn’t spring 
from rational thought, but rather deep emotion of identity (Connor 1994:202). Or as 
Smith writes: 
“… rational explanations for these phenomena always miss the point. 
Economic explanations in terms of modernisation and class conflict or 
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relative deprivation, or political explanations in terms of state power 
and institutions, or individualistic rational-choice theories of the 
strategic manipulations of the intelligentsia, must by their very nature 
fail to ‘reflect the emotional depth of national identity’, and the love, 
hatred and self-sacrifice it inspires.” 
(Smith 1998: 162) 
Hall also talks about this identity. He sees identity as a constructed image that helps us 
position ourselves in the world. It is therefore not only an emotional concept, but a 
political one, too. 
“It is always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and 
myth. Cultural identities are the points of identification, the unstable 
points of identification or suture, which are made, within the 
discourses of history and culture. Not an essence but a positioning. 
Hence, there is always a politics of Identity.” 
(Hall 1993: 226, own emphasis) 
So how does it work, this “politic of Identity”, as nationalism can thus be described? 
Smith argues that a very common way  of a nation to be formed is through vernacular 
mobilization. This is when nationalist leaders and intelligentsia furnish “blueprints of the 
‘nation-to-be’ by rediscovering an ‘authentic’ popular ethno-history and providing 
convincing narratives of historical continuity with a heroic, and preferably glorious, ethnic 
past” (Smith 1998: 195). This leads to a nation founded on an “authentic” ethnic identity.  
 
If we look at nationalism on its own terms, from the inside, three basic goals can be found 
in every kind of nationalism, says Smith: the ideals of national autonomy, national unity 
and national identity. These goals are in turn based on five core beliefs or premises, which 
can be added to or adjusted according to specific cases (Smith 1998: 188). 
The core beliefs are: 
1. “the world is naturally divided into nations, each of which has 
its peculiar character and destiny; 
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2. the nation is the source of all political power, and loyalty to it 
overrides all other loyalties; 
3. if they wish to be free, and to realize themselves, men must 
identify with and belong to a nation; 
4. global freedom and peace are functions of the liberation and 
security of all nations; 
5. nations can only be liberated and fulfilled in their own sovereign 
states.” 
(Smith 1973: 10) 
Nationalism has become an increasingly important issue in Kyrgyz politics. The largest 
party in parliament, the Ata-Jurt, is also the most nationalist. The leader of Ata-Jurt, 
Kamchibek Tashiyev, said the following in an interview with a Russian news agency:  
“The titular nation must be superior; it cannot be inferior to the other 
ethnicities in the country. These latter must respect our tradition, our 
language, our history, and then everyone will live in peace… This is why 
the Uzbeks living in our country must learn our language, esteem our 
traditions, and know our culture… we have forgotten to affirm that the 
masters of Kyrgyzstan are the Kyrgyz.“ 
(Ivaschenko 2010) 
We reach here an important point: the power of the elite in forming nationalistic 
sentiments and ideologies. The moderately instrumentalist theorist Paul Brass, argues 
that elites can select from the range of symbols of the ethnic communities those that best 
unite the community and then use these symbols to mobilise the population for social 
and political advantage (Brass 1991). 
All the people we spoke to recognized this to be true in Kyrgyzstan. As the leader of a 
local NGO told us, “It is not the people’s conflict, it is a conflict on state level… A third party 
is needed in this conflict” (Tilavaldieva 0:58:20). 
Because of competition between elites, a politicization of culture is created, i.e. turning 
the self-definition of the community from that of an ethnic group to one of a nationality 
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competing with others in the political arena. In other words, ethnies are converted to 
nationalities (Brass 1991: ch. 2). 
Barth argues that ethnic groups are mobilized more by political leaders and entrepreneurs  
than popular will. Smith agrees, but stresses that elites cannot mold ethnies by will; they 
must rely on the social memory that is already present within the community. However, 
he does note that “human agency, individual and collective, has been vital in the process 
of uniting ethnies and transforming them into nations”  (Smith 1998: 180, 194). 
John Armstrong adds that institutions are seriously important preservers and directors of 
collective cultural identities. (Smith 1998: 195) However, this does not in itself mean that 
the elite has complete control of the use of nationalism; they might cultivate it, but they 
do not control the feelings it stirs in people.  
 
A concrete example of the role of state, can be found in the 2001 presidential decree on 
the “assistance measures for ethnic Kyrgyz to return to their historical fatherland” – later 
followed by the Kairylman, a state program for ethnic Kyrgyz diaspora. This effort to 
repatriate Kyrgyz reinforced the ideal of Kyrgyzstan as a state based on ethnic nationalism 
(Laruelle 2012: 44). 
 
John Hutchinson speaks of cultural versus political nationalism. While a political 
nationalist has an ideal of an elite of educated citizens uniting the nation through equal 
law and a representative nation (Hutchinson 1987: 12-14, 41), the cultural nationalist 
“seeks to unite the nation through a rediscovery of moral and cultural principles that have 
always been there through their civilization’s unique history, culture and geography.” 
Smith argues, that these cultural and political nationalism alternates in influence as 
competing ideals (Smith 1998: 177). 
 
It is important to remember that the feeling of a common, unique past does not need, 
and in almost all cases will not, be factually correct. But that doesn’t really matter, since 
all a nation needs to exist is that its members share an idea of origin and evolution 
separate from others (Connor 1994: 202). 
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We have seen that a strong ethnic identity relies on the markers of the ethnie, primarily 
through symbols, myths and language. With that in mind, let’s take a look at the civic and 
ethnic forms of nationalism that have influenced Kyrgyz society since independence.  
 
Often, both civic and ethnic nationalism have been used in conflicting ways at the same 
time and even by the same actors. This was the case with the president, Akayev, who at 
the same time promoted Kyrgyzstan as “our common home” with full inclusion of all 
ethnies while promoting the superiority of the Kyrgyz. 
“Akayev thus sought to reconcile two contradictory trends: the 
country’s interethnic stability by proclaiming Kyrgyzstan a homeland 
for all its  inhabitants, and special pledges to the titular nationality, 
which deemed itself to have been mistreated by the minorities of the  
republic (Russians and Uzbeks) as well as by Moscow’s repression of 
symbols of pre-Soviet national identity.” 
(Laruelle 2012: 40) 
For a long time, the government has preserved sentiments of a communist identity (which 
promoted a civic identity rather than ethnic) alongside national, cultural ideology. As 
Cummings puts it, “in the 1990s the ruling elite was able to sit comfortably with a 
communist past and a capitalist future”  (Cummings 2013: 612).  
This means that there are two main types of patriotism in Kyrgyzstan today, depending 
on who you talk to: "patriotism is presented either as a civic identity against the rise of 
ethno-nationalism, or as a political expression of ethno-nationalism”(Laruelle 2012: 45). 
Generally, civic nationalism is the most popular form in the north of Kyrgyzstan, while the 
south – where most Uzbeks live – is dominated by ethnic nationalism and ethnic 
discrimination is especially widespread in the Osh region (Toroev 2013 0:40:43).  
Looking at civic nationalism in Kyrgyzstan, we see: 
 A constitution and laws that refer to equality for all ethnies 
 A number of institutions with the official goal of improving ethnic relations 
 Embracement of Soviet symbols 
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The laws in general are fairly good and “there are no ethnic preferences that are stated 
in the laws” (Toroev 0:21:28). As an example, the constitution is written to make all 
ethnies equal to the law, e.g. stating that no one may be discriminated on the basis of 
ethnicity and that all are allowed to determine their own ethnicity (Maksytova 0:34:28, 
Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2010)       . 
There are also a number of state institutions promoting ethnic equality. In his time, 
Akayev established the Peoples’ Assembly where cultural centers of different ethnies are 
all given equal place. The Peoples’ Assembly was also meant to represent the ethnic 
minorities, and to work with the state in making cooperation mechanisms (UNDP 2005: 
44). In 2013, other institutions have been created, e.g. the agency for Local Administration 
Cases and for the Cases of Ethnic Minorities whose task is to coordinate between 
institutions in order to achieve “mutual trust and understanding”(Toroev 0:37:41-
0:41:55). A leader of a local Kyrgyz NGO also mentions a new government program called 
"Development of Ethnicities" (Mamasalieva 0:21:57). A cleanout of lower district judges 
is also underway in which Uzbek judges are welcome to apply (Toroev 0:42:20). 
The influence of civic nationalism has to a large degree shown itself in the form of holding 
on to Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet past. One of the most noticeable examples of this is the many 
statues and busts of Lenin in the public sphere as well as streets, schools, and places 
named after Lenin. While other former Soviet republics in Central Asia had statues of 
Lenin removed from central squares in the capital, Kyrgyzstan let them stay where they 
were (Cummings 2013: 609). 
Especially illustrating is the case of the over 10 meter tall Lenin statue in Bishkek’s main 
square in front of the national museum. In 2003, it was moved from the front of the 
museum to the back; 20 tons of metal moved just about 90 meters. In its place was first 
put a statue of a woman holding a sacred piece of a yurt, the Kyrgyz nomadic hut. 
However, this honour is usually reserved for men and therefore was met by hard criticism 
from nationalists. This new monument – which had been known as the Statue of Liberty 
of Kyrgyzstan – was then again replaced by a statue of Manas in 2011, less than a year 
after the violence in Osh (Cummings 2013: 609). 
While the Lenin statue can be seen to reflect the values of Soviet citizenship and an 
identity connected to the society as a whole rather than specific ethnies, the new statues 
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– and especially Manas – symbolized traditional values and the historic legacy of the 
Kyrgyz ethnie. 
So even though civic nationalism has had its influence, cultural nationalism has turned 
out to be far the strongest. Since the middle of the 1990s it has taken over as the preferred 
symbolic and mythological reference by the Kyrgyz elite (Cummings 2013: 615). 
This seems to have had the greatest influence on the population as a whole, reflected in 
what was told to us be the Uzbek community, we spoke to: 
"… in the white house, the deputies try to say that we have to pay 
attention to the minority language, we need to help them… But in the 
streets, in practice, it’s different. When you go out you see this 
humiliating attitude towards you. Especially young people, their 
attitude is getting worse." 
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:18:37) 
Cultural nationalism seeks legitimization through a common past and ethnic identity, and 
has been the dominant form of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Hutchinson presents three 
propositions of the dynamics of cultural nationalism: 
 
1. Historical memory is important in the formation of nations 
2. Several definitions of what the nation is usually compete 
3. Cultural symbols are central to convey attachment to the nationalist group 
(Hutchinson 1987: 19-30) 
 
 In Kyrgyzstan, we see these characteristics expressed in the following ways: 
 A strong mythomoteur promoting Kyrgyz identity in the form of the Manas epic 
 A number of symbols referring to this identity, especially in the city of Osh  
 Language politics as an elite tool of nationalism 
Starting from the top, the all-encompassing myth of the Kyrgyz ethnic identity and nation 
is Manas. It is said that Manas is an ancient nomadic tribe leader with an unbroken lineage 
of at least 1000 years. The story is told in form of an epic poem known to be the world’s 
longest. It tells of Manas as he struggles and succeeds in uniting 40 different Kyrgyz 
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nomadic clans, thus creating the first Kyrgyz state. It is from this story that the flag of 
Kyrgyzstan is created: a red background (red is said to be Manas’ original banner colour) 
with a yellow sun with 40 rays as seen through the top of the traditional yurt used by 
Kyrgyz nomads (Namatbaeva , Wachtel 2013: 6, Hiro 2009). 
The author of “Manas – Lost and Found: A Bridge Linking Kyrgyzstan’s Epic to Ancient 
Oracles” takes it further, tracing the history of Manas and Kyrgyzstan back almost three:  
"DNA, linguistic, musical, and literary matches also reinforces 
evidence that ‘Manasseh son of Jacob’, who left the Near East's slopes 
2700 years ago is the same ‘Manas son of Jakyb’ we see in Kyrgyzstan's 
national epic [..] any aspect of Kyrgyz culture would reveal similar 
associations." 
(Hewitt 2013: 153) 
Even though this is a common notion, there are, in reality, only very sparse mentions of 
Manas in recorded history. Rather, he seems to be a mix of several different myths, 
historical events and simply inventions – what Armstrong calls a mythomoteur. This is 
also what Smith means, when he claims that “Myths of ethnic descent generally contain 
a kernel of factual truth, but they typically elaborate, exaggerate and idealise that kernel 
in a one-sided fashion” (Smith 1998: 149). 
This strong emphasis on national legend shows the power of myths in creating identity. 
In Manas we find both historic legitimacy of rule, unquestionable moral guidelines  and a 
sense of unique worth, kinship and common fate. All of these are highly useful in creating 
a nation. As Laruelle says:   
“Manas embodies the values publicly cherished by the Kyrgyz state: a 
warrior defender of the motherland, the incessant struggle for 
independence waged by the Kyrgyz, an ideal of self-defense, and of 
self-preservation” 
(Laruelle 2012: 41) 
The legend of Manas works, in other words, to legitimize the ideas that the nation is the 
natural source of power, that loyalty to it is an ancient ethical value, that unity through 
the nation is what the Kyrgyz culture is fundamentally based on, and that the Kyrgyz 
people have lived in Kyrgyzstan for many centuries and therefore have a natural right to 
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rule it. Furthermore, as Cummings notes, this is combined with a “hegemonic status 
where criticism, particularly of the epic hero, is considered unpatriotic” (Cummings 2013: 
609). 
So even though the constitution is widely recognized as protecting the rights and equality 
of minorities, in the light of the current nationalist influence, it is hard not to think that 
the first two lines of it also have a nationalist. It reads: "We, the people of Kyrgyzstan, 
paying tribute to the memory of heroes who rendered life for freedom of the people” 
(Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2010: 1). 
It seems that Kyrgyz politicians have very much been aware of the political usefulness of 
nationalism. In 2003, at time of declining popularity and upcoming elections nearing, 
Akayev arranged a celebration of ”2200 years of Kyrgyz statehood”. At the same time, a 
new history textbook was introduced by the Academy of Sciences: “History of the Kyrgyz 
of Kyrgyzstan” (Laruelle 2012: 40). 
The year earlier, he had presented seven lessons to be learned from Manas, both on a 
state and citizen level:  
“For the Kyrgyz people, Manas is more than an epic… It is what the 
Bible is to Christians... it is easy to see that for the ancient Kyrgyz 
people and its constituents, the epic was a prototype for the national 
constitution, a code of laws and decrees, a code of honor and morals, 
a testament for the Kyrgyz generations to come.” 
(Akayev 2002: 280-282, quoted in Laruelle 2012) 
The use of the Manas myth by politicians to legitimatize their rule means that history has 
become ethnicized, argues Laroulle. This shows itself in other narratives of the state, too: 
“Peasants or nomads are exaggeratedly foregrounded as the site of 
preservation of national authenticity, whereas urban cultures, in 
which minorities are dominant, benefit from more discrete mentions."  
(Laruelle 2012: 40) 
We saw this for ourselves when walking on a large road in Osh. It divided on one side a 
Kyrgyz neighborhood and on the other an Uzbek. At one point, the road turned into a 
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bridge and on each side a long wall depicted ancient folk stories in bright colours. Arching 
over the road was a large metal monument in the shape of a yurt and close to it an 
impressive statue of a horse rider. We learned later that this road had actually been one 
of the busiest market streets of the Uzbeks who used to set up booths and other small 
shops along the road. However, all the shops were set on fire during the June 2010 Events. 
Afterwards, the government of Osh had renovated it and decorated it with Kyrgyz 
symbols (Khodzaeva ).  
Another example of ethnicized history can be found in the book on Manas by Richard 
Hewitt. In the introduction the author mentions a school program, Moral Knowledge, 
imposed in 2000 by the Ministry of Education and Culture. This "wonderful course was 
developed to teach students about Kyrgyz culture, literature, and morality within the 
global context of world literature"(Hewitt 2013: x). 
 
Moral Knowledge is far from the only subject with nationalist edge being taught in 
Kyrgyzstan. Universities also offer courses in Manasology and the Academy of Sciences 
has a department devoted to research on Manas (van der Heide 2008). Just last year, the 
Ministry of Education made a course in “Manas Studies” mandatory for all university 
students (Wachtel 2013: 7).  
 
The current president, Almazbek Atambaev, continues the path of cultural nationalism. 
When addressing the outside world, he mentions Kyrgyzstan as an international 
community, but when it comes to national politics, the tone is different and his speeches 
draw heavily on Kyrgyz myths and symbols. This is one example from a speech in 2011: 
“A long time ago we asked some scholars what we should do, and it 
turns out that all the necessary answers can be found in the epic 
Manas. We have forgotten that we are a single people and our future 
is in unity. If we are not united, then the Kyrgyz people will disappear.”  
(Wachtel 2013: 14) 
If the future is in unity, the next logic step is to promote the use of a single language. And 
this is indeed what we see happening in Kyrgyzstan, where the use and knowledge of the 
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titular language, i.e. Kyrgyz, is seen as necessary, and as a form of acknowledgement of 
the superiority of the Kyrgyz ethnie (Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012). 
A popular saying is that the fate of the language is the fate of the nation. This is one 
example, argues Landua, that “Loss of the titular language was perceived by nationalists 
as a loss of self; akin to being without memory, roots and kin, and doomed to extinction” 
(Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012: 120).  
This sentiment shows itself in the state politics. Like other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan 
“… intend[s] to become both national and monolingual. Turning the titular language into 
the dominant one leads to the exclusion or at least the downgrading of the others, rather 
than creating an environment of inclusion” (Kellner-Heinkele, Landau 2012: 3). 
A number of laws, programmes, and institutions have been made to protect and spread 
the use of Kyrgyz: 
 Knowledge of Kyrgyz is a condition for obtaining citizenship 
 Holding a place in public office requires passing a Kyrgyz language test 
 An increasing number of university departments teach only in Kyrgyz 
 In 2020, all state employees, no matter ethnic identity, must speak a high level of 
Kyrgyz (C1). This effectively rules out the Uzbek population.  
 At least 50 percent of radio and television broadcasts must be in Kyrgyz and 
produced in Kyrgyzstan. 
 All advertisement must be in Kyrgyz (Fabrizio 0:02:26) 
 September 23 has been made the Day of the State Language in Kyrgyzstan 
 The National Commission on the State Language has been set up to promote the 
use of Kyrgyz language. 
(Fumagalli 2007, Maksytova , Laruelle 2012, Wachtel 2013) 
Uzbeks are deeply dissatisfied with this development, although they have only rarely 
shown this publicly (there were some smaller demonstrations in 2006 and 2007) (Kellner-
Heinkele, Landau 2012, Laruelle 2012: 40).  
”After 2010, there is a very strong demand from state authorities that everybody has to 
know the Kyrgyz language,” an Uzbek woman from a local NGO told us in an interview, 
quickly adding: ”Of course, this is a good policy” (Tilavaldieva 0:47:40).  
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She later continued to tell us about the consequences of the strong pro-Kyrgyz language 
policies: 
”Uzbek people are stuck in this problem, because if they learn Uzbek 
language [..] they will not be able to work in Kyrgyzstan, and they are 
not able to work in Uzbekistan, because they use the Latin system. So 
we, the Uzbek people, became unnecessary in this regard.” 
(Interview with (Tilavaldieva 0:50:00) 
An unnamed member of staff from a major international organization working with the 
Kyrgyz government on legislation, named language politics as the  most important inter-
ethnic issue of today. “If the language issue is not taken care of, we will see an increase in 
inter-ethnic conflict,” the employee said. 
How do the Uzbeks respond - Exit, Voice, or Loyalty? 
We have so far argued that the Kyrgyz nationalist narrative of the Uzbeks’ role in society 
is that they are foreigners being welcomed into Kyrgyzstan, that they are a lower class 
than Kyrgyz, and that they have provoked and initiated violence against the Kyrgyz 
people, e.g. in the June 2010 Events. Also, the Uzbeks are perceived to not have done 
their duty to accept and take part in the Kyrgyz way of life.  
The experience of Laruelle shows the same: 
“The political scientist Mars Sariyev, for example, explained in 
discussing the events in Osh in 2010: ‘The Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan have 
the chance to live in a democratic and economically free country, 
which is not the case in neighboring Uzbekistan. Here they are not 
persecuted and can engage in business freely. And just look how they 
thank us.’” 
(Laruelle 2012: 44) 
On the other hand, Uzbeks see themselves as victims of oppression by a powerful majority 
who discriminates against them on a wide range of areas, including social services and job 
opportunities, as well as exorcises violence in the form of killings, arsons, imprisonment, 
and torture. 
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What we have so far not looked at in detail, is the response of the Uzbek community to 
this situation. What is their reaction to the ethno-centric Kyrgyz nationalism? How do they 
thank the Kyrgyz? 
To help answer this question, we will look to Albert Hirschman (1970, 1993) and his theory 
of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Hirschman’s model deals with situations in which a member of 
an organization in “any economic, social, or political system" faces deteriorating 
conditions (Hirschman 1970: 1). 
That person (the member) has two options to express the discontent, argues Hirschman: 
Exit and Voice.  
1. Exit: leave the organization. 
2. Voice: attempt to change the state of affairs by any form of expression to the 
organization itself or anyone else who wants to listen. The goal is to make those 
in power to change the situation rethink and search for possible cures to the 
members dissatisfaction (Hirschman 1970: 4, 30, Hirschman 1993: 176). 
In our case, the choice of exit is to leave Kyrgyzstan, either for good or as migrant workers. 
The choice of voice is to display dissatisfaction through public debate, criticism in the 
cultural sphere (e.g. books or cinema), demonstrations, riots, or in other ways to simply 
display discontent.  
We have seen both options in use, although the by far most dominant choice is exit. Many 
Uzbeks, especially young men, leave to Russia and Kazakhstan as migrant workers. This 
phenomenon is also seen at a regional level within Kyrgyzstan, i.e. as internal migration. 
After 2010, it has become normal for men to leave the city, where the most discrimination 
takes place, in order to find jobs in rural areas, leaving their mothers to take their place 
in the businesses  (Interview with Uzbek women). 
However, this phenomenon may only be seen as partly exiting, since both internal and 
external migrant workers leave in order to send back remittances to their families who 
stay behind – and often with the subtext to return when things get better.  This is what 
Hirschman calls boycott– “a temporary exit” by which “… it is understood that the 
member-customer will return to the fold in case certain conditions which have led to the 
boycott are remedied” (Hirschman 1970: 86). 
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When it comes to the voice option, Uzbeks have generally used it in the form of protests, 
e.g. in the Aksy demonstrations in 2002  or the demonstrations following Tulip Revolution. 
In the eyes of Kyrgyz nationalists, the June 2010 Events also fall under this category. 
However, in the larger picture voice has only sporadically been chosen as the preferred 
option by Uzbeks.  
Hirschman argues that in order find the most viable option, members weigh the cost of 
exit versus the cost of voice. The greater the cost, the less likely it is to be taken in use. 
Naturally, if the cost of one option rises, the other choice becomes relatively lower and 
so more attractive. For example, if the price for choosing to exit becomes bigger, the 
chance that the member will choose voice increases, too (Hirschman 1974: 431-439). 
When evaluating whether members are likely to exit, two main questions must be 
considered: to what degree are members willing to risk the uncertainty of changing 
circumstances, and how do members estimate their ability to influence the organization? 
(Hirschman 1970: 30-37) 
The first part has to do with the cost of exit. By staying, Uzbeks have the prospect of things 
becoming better, while fully exiting is (almost) permanent. This means that the cost of 
exit has to be sufficiently low to be a worthwhile option. In the case of Uzbeks, the cost 
of exit is quite high, since they really have nowhere to go; Uzbekistan send back thousands 
of Uzbeks after the June 2010 Events, showing that it is not interested in receiving Uzbeks. 
Uzbekistan is also unattractive to Uzbeks, because of its totalitarian rule.  
Consider this in comparison to Russians who are leaving on a large scale even though their 
situation is far less deteriorating than that of the Uzbeks. This can be explained by their 
simply having a low cost of exit, since they can easily travel to Russia or any other Russian 
speaking country. 
One could argue that internal migration to safer areas in Kyrgyzstan is also a form of exit. 
However, the cost of internal migration is also quite high, because of the propiska system, 
which makes it very difficult to receive social services when moving. At the same time, 
internal migration only removes part of the problem as the migrants will still need to 
access and use public services, which are provided by the authorities that they are trying 
to escape.  
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But, argues Hirschman, in order to assess the relative risk of exit, we need to also take 
into account the effectiveness of voice: 
 “… the decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the 
prospects for the effective use of voice. If customers are sufficiently 
convinced that voice will be effective, then they may well postpone 
exit. Hence, quality-elasticity of demand, and therefore exit, can also 
be viewed as depending on the ability and willingness of the customers 
to take up the voice option.”  
(Hirschman 1970: 37) 
Originally, Hirschman saw the options of exit and voice as opposites that worked against 
each other. If exit is used, the chance of voice being used is lowered, since discontent with 
the situation is now reduced. Hirschman has described this view with the metaphor of a 
hydraulic valve:  
 “… deterioration generates the pressure of discontent, which will be 
channeled into voice or exit; the more pressure escapes through exit, 
the less is available to foment voice… In many situations, exit thus 
tends to undermine voice, particularly, so I argued, when exit deprives 
the potential carriers of voice of their most articulate and influential 
members, as is often the case.”  
(Hirschman 1993: 176) 
However, he later adjusted his view, adding that exit and voice can actually reinforce each 
other: “… exit can cooperate with voice, voice can emerge from exit, and exit can reinforce 
voice” (Hirschman 1993: 202). This is because, he argued, that when allowed more 
choices members will also become more aware of their choices and accordingly become 
more keen to take advantage of all opportunities offered to them (Hirschman 1993: 177): 
“…when previously unavailable opportunities to exit are forced open, 
people may experience new feelings of empowerment. They might 
then consider or reconsider other options, including that of reacting to 
an odious state of affairs by a direct attempt at change-through voice-
instead of by moving away from it.”  
The Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan   Andreas Winther Rohde & Troels Kølln 
86 
 
(Hirschman 1993: 186) 
For the Uzbeks, the use of exit has lowered the possibility of voice in the sense that the 
well-educated elite leaves for Europe or the US. This includes many outspoken leaders, 
often in the face of long imprisonment sentences (Jarnvig 2013 0:19:06). This lowers the 
effectiveness of voice for Uzbeks, since those who have the greatest ability and desire to 
express their discontent leave. 
 
This leads us to a point made by the game theorist Scott Gehlbach, who has developed a 
formalized model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. He suggests that “those leaders whose 
preferences are not aligned with their citizens” (Gehlbach 2006: 6) have a special interest 
in suppressing voice, but not necessarily exit: 
 
“Leaders will typically have an incentive to suppress voice… since by 
doing so they can reduce the probability that they have to bargain with 
individuals over policy. However, they may or may not want to 
suppress exit: doing so reduces what must be surrendered to 
individuals within the organization, but increases the probability that 
individuals find their common voice.” 
(Gehlbach 2006: 2). 
This is directly related to the Uzbek situation. Gehlbach presumes that there is a conflict 
of interest between the organization and the member, and this is exactly the situation for 
the Uzbeks versus the nationalist Kyrgyz state. Here, the Kyrgyz state has an interest in 
not only allowing the Uzbek elite to leave the country, but also forcing them to, since it 
lowers the probability that the Uzbeks will speak up and demand change.  
Voice is generally viewed as the most costly option, says Hirschman – it is both demanding 
and uncertain (it demands an effort, but you don’t know if or how it will have an effect) 
while exit is a clear choice (you either leave or you don’t)(Hirschman 1970: 43).  
It is definitely the case for Uzbeks that they perceive the price of voice to be very, very 
high and at the same time ineffective. In our interview with members of an Uzbek 
community in Osh, the leader first warned the others to hold back in what they told us. 
They also declined to have their photo taken with us and did not want to receive this 
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report afterwards. All this “in order to not have any suspicions on us“ (Interview with 
Uzbek Community 0:43:26). 
This is largely due to the strong cultural nationalism we have already described. To give 
an illuminating example, let’s go return to the ousting of president Bakiyev in April 2010. 
In the weeks after, nationalist supporters of the former president took over government 
offices, organized large demonstrations and sometimes took part in violent clashes with 
authorities in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan (Trilling, Dalbaeva 2010).  
The local administration in Osh actively sought the help of the Uzbek community to 
counter the Bakiyev loyalists. On request, leaders of Uzbek communities issued letters of 
support of the interim government and helped organize crowds of people to recapture 
occupied buildings. 
The Uzbek elite took this as a sign by the administration that they were allowed back onto 
the political scene. As an Uzbek leader, former member of parliament and successful 
businessman, Kadyrjan Batyrov, said in a on May 14:  
“… from now on, Uzbeks who live in Kyrgyzstan will not remain in their 
role as observers … we want to actively participate in the governance 
of the state, in the political life of Kyrgyzstan … the Uzbeks stood hard 
on their position and fulfilled their part in fighting the previous 
regime.”  
(CA-News 2010) 
However, this sparked a strong nationalist reaction with many Kyrgyz as it was perceived 
as a threat to the nationalist dogma that “alien rule is illegitimate rule” (Connor 1994: 
196) For example, newspapers printed articles calling for the expulsion of Uzbeks from 
Kyrgyzstan in order to secure land for the Kyrgyz people (Solvang, Neistat et al. 2010). In 
the end, Batyrov and five other Uzbek community leaders were charged in absentia8 for 
spreading separatist propaganda, inciting ethnic hatred, and organizing clashes between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the June events (RFE/RL 2011, Forestier-Walker 2013). 
This creates a situation where “those who are affected by quality decline do vent their 
feelings in one way or another, but management happens to be inured or indifferent to 
                                                          
8 Batyrov is now a refugee in Sweden 
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their particular reaction and thus does not feel compelled to correct its course” (Hirschman 
1970: 122).  
Combined with the memory of both the 1990 and 2010 violence, it is clear to see how the 
option of voicing dissent is seen as having a high price and low effectiveness. But if exit is 
then the least costly option and thereby the most attractive, then why would voice even 
by a viable option to begin with?  
Loyalty – or loyalty behaviour – is the “postponement of exit in spite of dissatisfaction and 
qualms” (Hirschman 1970: 104). Curiously, Hirschman never actually defines loyalty (and 
neither do many of those applying it in research). However, it is implied that loyalty is an 
emotional attachment to the product or the organization (Hirschman 1970: 98).  
This mean that there is reason to stick with the situation even though it is deteriorating – 
and so loyalty is what keeps members from exiting the organization (the cost of leaving is 
too high because of the emotional bond), but also what increases the incentive to voice 
discontent. In other words, loyalty means that “members may be locked into their 
organizations a little longer and thus use the voice option with greater determination and 
resourcefulness than would otherwise be the case” (Hirschman 1970: 82-83). 
It is important to note that ”an individual member can remain loyal without being 
influential”, though it will usually be in the expectation that someone else will act or the 
situation change in some other way (Hirschman 1970: 78). 
This is exactly what the Uzbek community leaders told us: “We only have to be patient. 
There is nothing else, we can do. We just ask that God will give some wisdom to Kyrgyz 
people” (Uzbek Community 0:37:08). 
Here loyalty shows itself as a form of patience by the Uzbek. Sometime and somehow, by 
someone, things will change for the better. This might help explain why Uzbeks as an 
ethnie are becoming more religious; in God they trust.  
As Hirschman notes, a member might simply ignore the deteriorating situation, if the 
stakes are high enough:  
“… the customer or member of the organization may have a 
considerable stake inself-deception, that is, in fighting the realization 
that the organization he belongs to or the product he has bought are 
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deteriorating or defective. He will particularly tend to repress this sort 
of awareness if he has invested a great deal in his purchase or 
membership.” 
(Hirschman 1970: 93) 
The Uzbek ethnie has a clear feeling that the Ferghana Valley is their homeland; it is part 
of their ethnic narrative that they have lived there for centuries as farmers and traders. If 
we take this perceived kinship through the ages into account, the Uzbeks have obviously 
invested a very great deal in their “membership”. This means that their loyalty is 
correspondingly high, since this kinship is tied to their “homeland” in the Ferghana valley 
even though it is ruled by an organization that has no interest in them.  
We noticed the self-deception – or at least the expressed, public self-deception – when 
speaking to Uzbeks. 
“Day by day, everything is getting better. And every person who tries 
his best to live, he lives. So little by little, every day is getting much 
better. For example, before we didn’t have gas, now we have gas. 
There was no water, now we have water. And perhaps there are a little 
bit problems with the road, but we will be solving it.  So everything is 
fine.” 
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:01:29-0:03:23) 
This explains why they can face deteriorating conditions over a long period of time 
without choosing neither exit, nor voice. The cost of exit is simply too high to be a realistic 
option, but at the same time so is voice, since it results in a violent response from a 
superior and hostile force.  
There are two likely outcomes from this situation. The first is that the acceptable 
threshold by the Uzbeks is finally crossed, leading to a sudden outburst of voice in the 
form of large demonstrations or riots, which will, if history is any indicator, be met by 
violence. This escalation is not to prefer as it will undoubtedly result in a number of 
deaths. 
Another outcome is that the state both realizes the level of dissatisfaction within the 
Uzbek community and acknowledges the legitimacy of that dissatisfaction. It would then 
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need to not just allow, but incite Uzbeks to participate in society on a larger scale . This 
would then work as a catalyst, speeding up the process of creating a multi-ethnic state 
and challenging the dominant cultural nationalistic basis of the state to a civic nationalist 
approach that allows for several ethnies to participate equally. 
It is this last scenario that we will work with in the next part, arguing that introducing 
measures of transitional justice will set off exactly the above described catalyst 
movement of voice.  
 
What should be done to improve the situation? 
Transitional justice is the process in which a society that has undergone genocide, civil 
war or similar atrocities cope, introducing extra judicial actions to address the problems, 
leaving a sense justice. The goal of the transitional justice is to address prior crimes in a 
manner satisfactory to the victims or their next of kin (Teitel 2003). Transitional justice is 
a multi-stringed phase embracing accountability, truth-seeking and truth-telling, 
reconciliation, institutional reform and reparations (Boraine 2005: 319). 
In order to address why the conditions for the Uzbeks have deteriorated, the lack of 
Transitional justice is an obvious factor. Not just did the violence in 2010 target the Uzbek 
ethnie, the perpetrators got away with it. In the light of the concept of Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty, the process of transitional justice will improve the perceived effectiveness of 
voice, thereby increasing the chances that the Uzbeks will take use of this option. This, in 
turn, will mean that the government of Kyrgyzstan to a greater extent will have to deal 
with Uzbek dissatisfaction. The lack of transitional justice is also a sign of a weak state not 
able to exorcise rule of law or the intentions do so.  
While the state of Kyrgyzstan was not able to stop the June 2010 Events, it could, 
however, have put emphasis on justice in the aftermath. The events heavily influenced 
the atmosphere in affected areas, one respondent, Karlybach, recalls. “… he was kind of 
shocked after coming back to the city - it is so different, the atmosphere was totally 
different. So different before this happened,” she said regarding a friend from Osh who 
returned after the events (Pak, Karlybach 2013 0:33:09). An Uzbek community leader 
from an affected area in Osh also stated: “The attitude is much worse than it was before 
2010” (Interview with Uzbek Community 0:19:37). 
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This implies that the events of June 2010 had a severe impact on the community and that 
there still were reminiscences of the conflict present. Transitional justice is to take place 
were events that took place in Osh in order to process the events. Ruti Teitel talks of 
dealing with an evil past, and as stated in the background section evil events did take 
place in the past (Teitel 2000: 3). 
The understanding of a transitional phase is not strictly limited to punitive measures to 
be taken through legal means. On the other hand, transition is understood in a broader 
sense as  
“…away from defining transitions purely in terms of democratic 
procedures, such as electoral processes, toward a broader inquiry into 
other practices signifying acceptance of liberal democracy and the 
rule-of-law.” 
(Teitel 2000: 5) 
This means that transitional justice is not a strictly legal matter. Beyond legal matters it is 
also a shift in the population’s interpretation of justice in a transitional society. This could 
be complicated by various circumstances and the rule of law could prove difficult in a 
transformational time, such as one right after a revolution (Teitel 2000: 5, 11). 
This is exactly what took place approximately three months prior to the June 2010 Events. 
However, the Kyrgyz political situation stabilized to an extent where it is hard to argue 
that the state is incapable to exercise its powers in legal matters. 
Whether rule of law includes retroactive laws and disregard of prior laws that accepted 
atrocities in the past, is an on-going discussion in the field of transitional justice. This 
discussion often refers to the Nurnberg trials of Nazi leaders, who were convicted 
retroactively (Teitel 2000: 13). Retroactively prosecuting individuals is often seen in 
events of regime change:  
“Versions of this transitional rule-of law dilemma are manifest in 
problems of successor justice, constitutional beginnings, and 
constitutional change”  
(Teitel 2000: 11). 
 But qua the attempted extradition of former President Bakiyev), this is not a legal 
obstacle to Kyrgyz authorities.  
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A more relevant point is that the crimes carried out doing the June 2010 Events were 
mostly arson, murder, violent assaults, rape and pillaging – all felonies regardless of 
regime. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz state had no difficulties in prosecuting almost entirely 
Uzbeks for crimes during the June 2010 Events. Regarding retroactive prosecutions, they 
sometimes rely on a moral imperative than a legal one in that “Procedurally, legal rights 
were distinct from moral rights” (Teitel 2000: 17).  
When assessing the ethnicity of individuals convicted, incarcerated (legally and extra-
legally) as well as the nature of the court proceedings, a question rises.  Have the 
authorities given more weight to moral rights than legal rights within a pro-Kyrgyz ethnic 
framework? In that matter it is also important to notice if it took place in a specific sphere 
of Kyrgyz society, since various spheres hold different meaning within the transitional 
justice interpretation by Ruti Teitel. 
According to Teitel, transitional justice includes five spheres of justice to operate with; 
criminal, historical, reparatory, administrative and constitutional. The five spheres will be 
accounted for and discussed in a Kyrgyz context (Teitel 2000).  
Criminal justice 
A common criminal justice approach is for a successor regime to hold trials implicating 
former regime representatives. This is done to mark a shift from one regime to another. 
The trials create clear moral guidelines – what is right and wrong in the world – and 
presents a new justice system (Teitel 2000: 27). 
The dilemma for a successor regime is whether to give amnesty or to seek punitive 
measures through legal means.  Another dilemma is to what specific level of the former 
regime should one prosecute. The most common approach is to conduct a symbolic 
punishment with limited criminal sanctions involved (Teitel 2000: 27-28). 
The punishment is considered a good way to move forward as it creates a sentiment of 
rule of law and a movement to a different societal formation in terms of justice. In the 
matter of amnesty, a lack of convictions can be feared to negatively inflict the sense of 
rule of law and justice (Teitel 2000: 28). 
In Kyrgyzstan, multiple cases from the June 2010 Events have been brought to court. But 
these are primarily aimed at Uzbek individuals and are conducted under dire conditions 
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with the use of torture (Solvang 2011: 37). Human Rights Watch notices in their report 
“Distorted Justice” about the legal situation after the June 2010 Events “that Kyrgyz law 
enforcement agencies investigating the violence have engaged in widespread and serious 
abuses of detainee rights, such as arbitrary arrest and detention, extortion, denial of due 
process guarantees, torture, and ill-treatment” (Solvang 2011: 18).  
 
This is reflected within the Uzbek communities, as one Uzbek community leader from an 
affected part of Osh told us: 
 “There is no justice, what we can say. When they came to our 
community, they all had weapons in their hands. There were tanks and 
big army cars. And they themselves had cameras... taking everything 
to the camera... and every Uzbek community person that is on this 
video, they are saying that you are on this camera, we can see you so 
that means that you participated in the riots and they were taken.” 
(Interview with Uzbek Community 0:28:04) 
A lawyer from a human rights advocacy organization called the “Light of Salomon” also 
stated: 
“Despite of this, out of all these killings, by this day, even today, 
nobody was detained or put charges, if it was an Uzbek person killed. 
So mainly all people who were detained, who were put charges on, 
were Uzbek ethnic people. That is why we can‘t talk about fairness at 
all.”  
(Interview with Makhmudov 0:16:12) 
These testimonies in combination with the data on trials provided in earlier sections show 
that not only did the concepts of rule of law not apply in the June 2010 Events, they are 
still not being applied in regards to the Uzbek victims and next of kin to those. 
Historical justice 
Historical justice normally follows repressive rule. It creates a common account of history, 
of what used to be right and wrong. The creation of a common history of the oppressive 
past helps produce the necessary foundation for a new democracy (Teitel 2000: 69). 
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The narrative of the new history is to some extent politicized, which is characteristic of 
oppressive regimes.Teitel argues that historical narratives are always present in one way 
or another, and that all regimes present themselves as righteous but in a more politicized 
manner in oppressive regimes (Teitel 2000: 70).  
In the immediate aftermath of independence the first President emphasized the multi-
ethnic nature of Kyrgyzstan, talking of “Kyrgyzstan is our common home” (Megoran 2010: 
46). This was meant to include all ethnic groups within the narrative that was the new 
sovereign state of Kyrgyzstan.  
As stated by Dr. Sabine Machl, representative of UN-Women in Kyrgyzstan:  
“… the first President here Akiyev[was] always rhetorically including 
everybody here and also speaking about our common house. He also 
understood, that he would need the voices of the minorities of 
remaining in power.” 
(Interview with Machl 07:06) 
 In order for a country to gather and comprehend testimonies of prior wrongdoings, truth 
commissions can be set up. They can also play a role in further criminal prosecutions of 
perpetrators – and have been used so in Latin America in the wake of military 
dictatorships, South Africa after Apartheid and a myriad of African countries after 
conflicts and genocide such as the one in Sierra Leone(Teitel 2000: 79). 
No truth commission has been set up in Kyrgyzstan after the June 2010 Events, and no 
common narrative regarding what more specifically happened has been created. A variety 
of narratives regarding the June 2010 Events exists, but none have gained wide 
hegemony, especially not across ethnic boundaries. This is evident in the contrasting 
accounts by Mederbekand the Uzbek community leaders(Mederbek 2013)(Uzbek 
Community). Even what the June 2010 Events are called differs depending on which 
individual you are talking to. As Nadezhda Pak, a student we interviewed, formulated it: 
”…  We[Unity Fund] normally call it, we always call it the tragedy, and 
June Events in some reports. So if you write a report to a grant giver, 
than we call it June Events. But in Osh it was called war, because they 
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could see a war. Here we don't, we did not see the actual, what was 
happening.” 
(Interview with Pak, Karlybach 0:29:27) 
Reparatoryjustice 
Reparatory Justice is intended to repair prior wrongs through some level of official 
compensation to victims. This variant of justice is perhaps the most common in 
transitional justice phases. Reparatory justice is almost always backward-looking, in that 
it is rectifying wrongs. It is supposed to create a social climate without grievances and 
victims feeling forgotten (Teitel 2000: 119).  
Reparatory measures have also been used between states that have been in war with 
each other. The most known cases are the Versailles treaty after World War I, 
condemning Germany to pay massive compensation, as well as the compensation paid by 
Germany to Israel after World War II (Boraine 2005: 324, Teitel 2000: 121, 123, 125). 
The compensation to victims is an official recognition of wrongdoings and can be an 
alternative to legal prosecutions of perpetrators (Teitel 2000: 127). Reparations can also 
serve as an incentive to participation in truth and reconciliation committees and in that 
way consolidate a transitional process (Teitel 2000: 128). The relation between 
reparations and reconciliation is also stressed by Alex Boraine, a transitional justice 
scholar, who argues that reconciliation cannot take place unless it is followed by 
acceptance of the past and responsibility to this (Boraine 2005: 330) Amnesty can also 
play a part of reparatory justice which might conflict with the rule of law since 
perpetrators are legally exonerated (Teitel 2000: 126). 
Reparatory measures have not been taken in Kyrgyzstan: the state has rejected 
responsibility in the events, mostly convicted Uzbeks, and neither participated in nor 
financially supported the reconstruction of damaged houses. The role of reconstruction 
has been conducted by (I)NGOs which is also reflected in the Uzbek communities’ 
perception. As Uzbek local leaders told us during an interview in an affected area in Osh: 
“When you get back to your country, don’t forget to say thank you from us, because the 
Danish republic helped us a lot, constructing houses” (Interview with Uzbek Community 
0:36:33). 
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Administrative justice 
Administrative justice is a direct way for a state to address change in a transitional phase. 
The medium of change is law and institutional change, almost certainly in favour of the 
new ruling clas(ses) (Teitel 2000: 149). The change of laws can seem forward-looking to a 
spectator, but they are often backward-looking and punitive in nature (Teitel 2000: 150).  
This is done do set a clear divide between right and wrong, a lot similar to criminal justice, 
which is derived from legislation passed by parliament. In the Kyrgyz context, no new laws 
have been introduced as a result of the June 2010 Events. While the Kyrgyz legislation 
remains progressive – both in signed law and constitution – the  implementation is 
lacking. As Dr. Sabine Machl states: 
“Here in Kyrgyzstan the tendency is there is lot of plans and also very 
good laws, but when it comes to implementation, there is always a big 
problem”  
(Interview with Machl 0:02:25). 
This sentiment is further confirmed by Kyrgyz policy analyst Chiara Fabrizio:  
 “… the right laws have been written, but not implemented properly. 
When you have a law you also have a regulative obligation to explain 
how to use that law. And that have not been done.” - 
(Interview with Fabrizio 0:27:13) 
The lack of implementation does not necessarily indicate ethnic bias; it could also be 
caused by weak state infrastructures. 
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Conclusion 
The Uzbeks have, as an ethnic group, experienced deteriorating conditions in Kyrgyzstan. 
In the June 2010 Events, Uzbek communities in the city of Osh were targeted and 
hundreds of Uzbeks were killed, raped, or had their homes and businesses burned to the 
ground. Authorities did not intervene to prevent this; in many cases, they willingly gave 
up automatic assault rifles and armoured vehicles to be used against Uzbeks.  
On a general level, cultural nationalism favouring the Kyrgyz people has meant a 
hardened ethno-centric public discourse aimed at excluding minorities from power. Given 
the size of the Uzbek ethnie, it has often been the preferred scapegoat by nationalists. 
Uzbeks today have minimal influence in the public sector, and are increasingly excluded 
from participating in politics and secondary education by overly high language barriers. In 
the city of Osh, where the vast majority of Uzbeks live,  there has been an increase of 
violence against Uzbek business owners, in many cases causing young Uzbek men to leave 
for other areas of the country while their mothers take over business.  
It is thus safe to say that the conditions of the Uzbek have worsened since democracy was 
introduced when Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991. The basis of this report is 
based on that apparent paradox: Why has democracy as a state form not led to an 
increase in political participation by Uzbeks and thereby to better conditions for that 
same population? 
One answer is that in a democracy, one must participate in political life to have influence. 
The Uzbeks have, in long periods and to this date, not participated. They are not part of 
civil service or the state apparatus in general, they do not voice their opinions in the public 
discourse, and with their votes they have simply voted for the least bad candidate. 
Looking at voters in general, our assumption that democracy would bring universal 
respect for human’s rights and lead to political and social inclusion seems to be flawed. It 
appears that a vast amount of people in Kyrgyzstan has voted in favour of their ethnic 
group and have not considered the common good of the entire population in Kyrgyzstan, 
thereby contributing to increased stigmatization of ethnic minorities in general and 
Uzbeks in particular. 
When the Uzbeks have voiced their discontent, the result has been negative in almost all 
cases. The scene was set when Uzbeks in 1990 advocated for autonomous rule which lead 
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to the expropriation of Uzbek land to Kyrgyz and an aftermath of violence. Things did not 
improve during democratic rule. When Uzbek leaders began to speak of more political 
participation following the April riots in 2010, they were given long prison sentences, 
forcing them to leave the country. And when Uzbek relatives of victims in the June 2010 
Events tried to file lawsuits, they were rejected by officials. 
The main reason for this, we argue, is the widespread sentiments and ideological use of 
cultural nationalism. Through the use of the myth of Manas, an ancient Kyrgyz hero who 
has united the people and defended the nation from its enemies, a nationalist discourse 
dominates Kyrgyz ethnic consciousness. The strong focus on the Kyrgyz as the only 
legitimate rulers of Kyrgyzstan has gradually stigmatized the Uzbeks, turning them, in the 
eyes of the Kyrgyz, into Others who are not equal to the Kyrgyz.  
This situation is not likely to change in the near future, since no transitional justice 
following the targeted violence of 2010. The lack of feeling of justice within the Uzbek 
ethnie results in the continuous perception by Uzbeks that they have a very low changing 
the situation by voicing their discontent. At the same time, they have experienced how 
voicing their discontent can result in very harsh consequences: violence, arsons, 
imprisonment. 
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Discussion 
When we observe how cultural nationalism continues to be the driving force on the 
political scene in Kyrgyzstan, we have to wonder: When will violence erupt again? 
From our outlook, there are no prospects of improvement unless – and this is a bare 
minimum -  both a process of transitional justice takes place and that this process will be 
enough incentive for the Uzbek community to become more involved in the political life 
of Kyrgyzstan. As an unnamed source from a major international agency told us, violence 
will return if the problems with discriminatory language policies and the lack of justice are 
not solved quickly. The same source also said that few people trust in the democratic 
system, since “revolutions have become routine in the minds of the people.” Time will 
show to what degree this pessimistic forecast will come true. 
However, it is important for us to underline that there is still much we don’t know about 
the dynamics of Kyrgyz society. Our model of explanation focuses on nationalism as the 
primary force of oppression of the Uzbek as an ethnic group, while analyzing its 
consequences in the scope of democracy using the concepts of stigma, lack of transitional 
justice and the idea of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Naturally, in this process of focus we have 
left out several factors of possible influence, and this gives cause to reflections on the 
limitations of our work limit 
For one, we have almost completely ignored the question of clans. Some academics have 
pointed to clans as a major political influence, in particular Collins (1999). In our 
interviews, similar views have at times arisen, but so have the opposite: that clans have 
only little influence today. This indicates that there is, if nothing else, an interesting field 
of study. And if it holds true that clans hold significant power in today’s Kyrgyzstan, it will 
certainly be a part of the explanation of why Uzbeks are not participating in politics – 
deduced by the simple fact that they do not have a clan system.  
Some of the respondents also pointed to organized criminal organizations as participating 
or causal factors in the conflict. As an example of how that might play a part, the Bakiyev 
family were suspected of making big money by allowing drug traders free access. The fall 
of Bakiyev shifted the power balance and the flow of money . It is easy to imagine, how 
this could have created a power vacuum where nationalists and criminal organizations 
assert them themselves in order to gain influence and resources. Links have been made 
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between nationalists and organized crime (Kupatadze 2008), but these have not 
described academically in such a quantity, that we could rely on it. Criminal organizations 
operate in the dark qua the nature of their enterprise, and their influence could be vast 
considering Kyrgyzstan’s location on the heroin smuggling trail. Data collection would 
however have been fundamentally different if we were to have illuminated this angle.  
An investigation into the influence of neighbouring states could also have turned up a 
very different analysis of the June 2010 Events. Some have argued that the external 
influence of competing states has played a major role in the development of Kyrgyzstan. 
As mentioned before, in spite of its shortcomings, the democratic nature of Kyrgyzstan is 
a rarity in the region. This could be seen as a threat to more autocratic regimes in the 
region, meaning that  they would have an interest in a non-functioning democracy as an 
example to their own population. An unstable central government in Kyrgyzstan could 
make it more dependable on outside support, hence giving outside the opportunity to 
better influence Kyrgyzstan according to own interests. Kyrgyzstan possesses few 
resources, but do however produce electricity which is sold to neighbouring states. This 
could constitute a motive for interference and influence.  
The geopolitical circumstances could as well play a part in the instability. At the moment, 
Kyrgyzstan hosts both an American and a Russian airbase, which has been the cause to 
political turmoil and shifting announcements. The Kyrgyz government has refused to 
renew the American lease for the Manas Airbase, which plays a crucial role in the ISAF 
military operations in Afghanistan, effectively ending US military presence in Kyrgyzstan. 
Russia clearly has an interest in this development since it consolidates its own influence 
in this region. Russia has also granted debt-cancellation and promised investments in 
infrastructure and thereby cemented its influence. A fully democratic and well-
functioning democracy in Kyrgyzstan could arguably be a bad example in Moscow’s view. 
We also note that an economic perspective could have provided us with other and 
different findings. Economic factors most certainly have some effect on the situation of 
the Uzbeks. For example, it the level and distribution of wealth in a society will naturally 
influence how groups interact. It would be interesting to combine our qualitative case 
study with a quantitative analysis – perhaps looking at whether there is correlation 
between the number of violent incidences and the level of income inequality. 
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All in all, many unanswered questions remain. While we do not claim to have all the 
answers, we hope to have presented a clear, convincing argument of how nationalism can 
work as a strong force in a society and how democracy is in no way a shield against 
injustice. As Rosa Luxembourg said: 
 “Freedom is always the freedom of the one who thinks differently.“ 
 (Luxemburg 1974: 359, own translation) 
We have yet to see that in Kyrgyzstan. 
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